We examine how creditor rights affect the trade-off between non-debt and debt tax shields. Using four bankruptcy reforms and a panel of private and public firms from Italy, we show that laws empowering creditors reduce tax avoidance and increase debt financing, consistent with firms substituting non-debt tax shields with debt tax shields. We corroborate the validity of our findings using a panel of public firms across 33 countries. Additionally, we document that the impact of creditor protection laws is mitigated by tax system characteristics, which significantly reduce the incentives to substitute tax avoidance with debt.

We examine the effect of compliance frictions in reclaiming foreign withholding tax overpayments on foreign portfolio investment (FPI) using data on bilateral FPI around the globe and U.S. institutional investors’ foreign holdings. Exploiting variation in withholding tax overpayments for 36 investor countries and 110 issuer countries, we find that withholding tax overpayments adversely affect FPI because of the high compliance costs to international investors in claiming foreign tax credits. Cross-sectional tests further show that the adverse effect of withholding tax overpayments on FPI is reduced when compliance costs in claiming these overpayments from foreign countries are lower. Our results indicate that eliminating most of the compliance costs in the reclaim process by implementing a relief at the source mechanism could increase FPI by about 7.6 percent.

This paper examines the effect of tax incentives in the form of bonus depreciation on investment quality. Using the expiration of tax incentives via bonus depreciation in eastern Germany and a representative panel of West German establishments, we show that bonus depreciation significantly lowers investment quality. The average quality of investments, measured by the responsiveness of future revenue and other proxies for cash flow to current investment, reduces by 15.2–23.8% in the short run and 31.8–41.4% in the long run. Our research suggests that this adverse effect of tax subsidies is greater for jurisdictions with higher tax rates, in times of high unemployment, and for large or low-productivity establishments. Overall, while increasing investment quantity, as shown by prior literature, tax incentives such as bonus depreciation substantially reduce the quality of investments.

Using granular gas price data and rich variation in corporate tax rates, we find that corporate taxes increase consumer prices. About 64% of the corporate tax is borne by consumers. The effect is stronger when firms have limited access to tax planning opportunities, face stricter tax enforcement, or when consumer demand is less elastic. Taxes also reduce the number of firms and their scale, consistent with a tax‐induced increase in marginal cost. Our results suggest that tax policies that increase effective corporate tax rates may have unintended consequences for consumers through higher prices.

The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at least 20 years. We examine a regulatory action in Austria in 2014 where the tax deductibility of the total value of executive compensation is unavoidably limited. We find no average effects on the growth or composition of executives’ pay. However, the deductibility limit affects the managers of firms with low bargaining power and of firms with strong corporate governance, indicating that they are affected by the deductibility limit. Additionally, the contract durations for executives decrease after renegotiation. We further find that affected firms experience cuts in investment and research and development, suggesting that shareholders bear part of the economic burden. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of other reforms, such as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, in restricting executive pay is rather limited.