We study the credit market impact and real effects of one of the largest borrower bailouts in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that the bailout led to a significant reallocation of credit and greater defaults, but had no offsetting positive effect on productivity, wages, or consumption. Post-program loan performance deteriorates faster in districts with greater program exposure, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become more sensitive to the electoral cycle after debt relief, suggesting strategic default in response to the bailout.

We examine how macroeconomic expectations affect consumer decisions, using an experiment with 2,872 credit card customers at a large commercial bank. In the experiment, participants are randomized into receiving expert forecasts of inflation and the nominal exchange rate. We find that forecasts shift inflation and exchange rate expectations, but do not change spending or self-reported consumption plans as predicted by standard models of intertemporal choice. Results from a supplementary survey experiment suggest that consumers are sophisticated enough to anticipate nominal rigidities and reduce spending on durables for precautionary reasons, counteracting the effects predicted by standard models of intertemporal optimization.

We study the credit market impact and real effects of one of the largest borrower bailouts in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that the bailout led to a significant reallocation of credit and greater defaults, but had no offsetting positive effect on productivity, wages, or consumption. Post-program loan performance deteriorates faster in districts with greater program exposure, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become more sensitive to the electoral cycle after debt relief, suggesting strategic default in response to the bailout. Received December 1, 2015; editorial decision April 11, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We present results from a field experiment that introduced digital payroll accounts to unbanked factory workers to examine how inexperienced consumers learn to use a new financial technology. We find that exposure to payroll accounts leads to increased account use, accelerated learning, and avoidance of common consumer protection risks. Those receiving electronic wage payments gradually build trust in the technology, learn to use accounts without assistance, and avoid illicit fees. Using experimental variation in assignment to bank versus mobile money accounts, we show that these impacts are concentrated in mobile money accounts, the newer, more complex, and less trusted financial technology.

We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience.

We study the role of morality in debt repayment, using an experiment with the credit card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients receive a text message stating that “non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice.” This moral appeal decreases delinquency by 4.4 percentage points from a baseline of 66 percent and reduces default among customers with the highest ex ante credit risk. Additional treatments help benchmark the effects against direct financial incentives and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder effects, priming religion, and provision of new information.

This article provides field-experimental evidence on status goods. We work with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, we show that demand for the platinum card exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. In a second experiment, we provide evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. A final experiment provides suggestive evidence that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods, indicating that social image might be a substitute for self-image.