This paper studies an overlapping generations model with multiple securities and heterogeneously informed agents. The model produces multiple equilibria, including highly volatile equilibria that can exhibit strong or weak correlations between asset returns—even when asset supplies and future dividends are uncorrelated across assets. Less informed agents rationally behave like trend‐followers, while better informed agents follow contrarian strategies. Trading volume has a hump‐shaped relation with information precision and is positively correlated with absolute price changes. Finally, accurate information increases the volatility and correlation of stock returns in the highly volatile, strongly correlated equilibrium.

[This paper studies whether stock returns' sensitivities to aggregate liquidity fluctuations and the pricing of liquidity risk vary over time. We find that liquidity betas vary across two distinct states: one with high liquidity betas and the other with low betas. The high liquidity-beta state is short lived and characterized by heavy trade, high volatility, and a wide cross-sectional dispersion in liquidity betas. It also delivers a disproportionately large liquidity risk premium, amounting to more than twice the value premium. Our results are consistent with a model of liquidity risk in which investors face uncertainty about their trading counterparties' preferences.]

This paper studies whether stock returns' sensitivities to aggregate liquidity fluctuations and the pricing of liquidity risk vary over time. We find that liquidity betas vary across two distinct states: one with high liquidity betas and the other with low betas. The high liquidity-beta state is short lived and characterized by heavy trade, high volatility, and a wide cross-sectional dispersion in liquidity betas. It also delivers a disproportionately large liquidity risk premium, amounting to more than twice the value premium. Our results are consistent with a model of liquidity risk in which investors face uncertainty about their trading counterparties' preferences.

[When a firm exercises discretion to disclose or withhold information (strategic disclosure), risk-averse investors command higher expected returns when expected cash flows decrease, producing a negative correlation between these expectations. Moreover, stock returns exhibit stronger reversal than they do when full disclosure is enforced. We propose a model that makes these predictions and provide consistent evidence using a panel of foreign firms that list American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). We find significant shifts in the time-series properties of stock returns for firms that undergo large changes in disclosure environments, such as those cross-listing on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and those from less-developed/emerging markets and code-law countries]

When a firm exercises discretion to disclose or withhold information (strategic disclosure), risk-averse investors command higher expected returns when expected cash flows decrease, producing a negative correlation between these expectations. Moreover, stock returns exhibit stronger reversal than they do when full disclosure is enforced. We propose a model that makes these predictions and provide consistent evidence using a panel of foreign firms that list American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). We find significant shifts in the time-series properties of stock returns for firms that undergo large changes in disclosure environments, such as those cross-listing on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and those from less-developed/emerging markets and code-law countries.