Clearinghouses were private organizations that not only had the power to audit member banks’ balance sheets and levy fines, but also provided emergency liquidity during large-scale financial panics. This paper studies how clearinghouses affected bank composition and solvency during stable periods as well as panics. An annual database of all national bank balance sheets from 1865 to 1914 indicates that national banks grew larger after the creation of a clearinghouse. Relative to the rise in assets, banks reduced their cash reserves and individual deposits and increased their loans, circulation, and interbank deposits. The analysis also shows that while clearinghouse members were less likely to fail during panics, they were more likely to fail in other periods, particularly those in non-financial centers. In this way, clearinghouses seem to have freed up additional resources during stable periods and delayed bank failures until the potential for contagion was removed.

Matthew Jaremski of Utah State University reviews “Virtuous Bankers: A Day in the Life of the Eighteenth-Century Bank of England” by Anne L. Murphy. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the eighteenth-century Bank of England's ability to command the confidence of a wide public while delivering a set of services that were essential to the English state, explaining how a private organization became the guardian of the public credit upon which the economic and geopolitical success of Britain was based.”

Operating in individual cities, US clearinghouses were the closest thing to a central bank before 1914, but they only assisted banks that chose to join the association. Using an annual bank-level database for seven states between 1880 and 1910, this paper shows that after the entry of a clearinghouse member banks were less likely and nonmember banks in the same city were more likely to close. The results are driven by the fact that the presence of clearinghouses led all banks to become more exposed to systemic liquidity risk, yet provided liquidity only to member banks during panics.

Individual deposits in the United States grew from 5% to 23% of GDP between 1863 and 1913. A comprehensive database shows bank entry underlying this trend while historical events, including the National Banking Acts, resumption in 1879, and the election of 1896, influenced deposits at the bank-level. The nation's embrace of deposits was thus driven by stability of the monetary system and confidence in the safety and utility of established and well-capitalized banks. Bank-level and county-level regressions confirm these patterns for national banks over the entire postbellum period and for a sample of Midwest state and national banks from 1888.

The high social costs of financial crises imply that economists, policymakers, businesses, and households have a tremendous incentive to understand, and try to prevent them. And yet, so far we have failed to learn how to avoid them. In this article, we take a novel approach to studying financial crises. We first build ten case studies of financial crises that stretch over two millennia, and then consider their salient points of differences and commonalities. We see this as the beginning of developing a useful taxonomy of crises – an understanding of the most important factors that reappear across the many examples, which also allows (as in any taxonomy) some examples to be more similar to each other than others. From the perspective of our review of the ten crises, we consider the question of why it has proven so difficult to learn from past crises to avoid future ones.

Excessively easy bank credit – visible in unusually small credit risk spreads and rapid loan growth – is often posited as a root cause of unsustainable asset price booms. This paper considers whether an increase in bank risk tolerance drove high loan growth that coincided with Florida's land boom of the mid-1920s, the first Florida housing boom in which buyers from around the nation participated. Estimates suggest that an astounding 20 million lots were offered for sale in Florida at that time. Our detailed narrative and empirical evidence suggest that the facts do not require the assumption of increased risk appetite during the boom. We find that most Florida banks that failed were associated with the Manley-Anthony chain and did not exhibit increases in observable indicators of risk during the boom. Instead, their increases in risk mainly reflected hidden choices either to lend to bank insiders on a preferential basis or to fund other banks that were engaged in such risky and often fraudulent activities. Bank regulators seem to have been complicit in the hidden risk-taking. Even informed investors would have been left in the dark about the amount of risk that was growing in Florida.

A nationwide panic forced President Roosevelt to declare a banking holiday in March 1933. The government reopened banks sequentially using a process that sent noisy signals about banks’ health. New microdata reveals that the public responded to these signals. Deposits at rapidly reopened banks rebounded quicker than at comparable or stronger banks that reopened even a few days later. The stigma of late reopening shifted funds from stigmatized to lauded banks and among communities that they served. Despite persisting over a decade, the shift had no measurable impact on the rate at which localities recovered from the Great Depression.

We study the effects of the Liberty Bond drives of World War I on financial intermediation in the 1920s and beyond. Using panel data on US counties, and an instrument that captures differences in the approaches used to market the bonds, we find that higher Liberty Bond subscription rates led to an increase in investment banks and a contraction in commercial bank assets. We also find that in the late 1930s, individuals residing in states where Liberty Bond subscription rates had been higher were more likely to report owning stocks or bonds. Although they were conducted to support the American effort in World War I, these bond drives reshaped American finance.

We study the role of war bonds and inflation in post-WWII federal elections. After WWII, major bouts of inflation in 1946-48 and 1950-51 depressed the real returns of the bonds sold to households during the war. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that counties with higher war bond purchases shifted their votes towards the Republican Party in postwar elections. To address the endogeneity of war bond purchases, we use an instrumental variables design, and obtain similar results. Bond ownership raised the saliency of inflation, and the severe rise in prices after the war triggered a backlash against the incumbent Democrats.