ABSTRACT Regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that social interaction leads auditors to unjustifiably trust managers, constituting a lack of sufficient professional skepticism. Using both an abstract laboratory experiment and a contextually rich experiment with practicing auditors we predict and find that higher Dark Triad auditors (those with higher levels of the shared core between psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) are relatively more resistant to lapses in professional skepticism due to the effects of social interaction. This is likely driven by higher Dark Triad auditors' callousness, lack of empathy, and lack of response to social stimuli. In contrast, while higher social interaction initially increases lower Dark Triad auditors' unjustified trust in managers, this effect reverses in subsequent interactions when lower Dark Triad auditors observe evidence suggesting managers have reported aggressively. These findings add to research on the effect of auditor personality traits, audit‐client social interaction, and the interaction of these two variables, and suggest that practitioners and researchers account for the interplay of Dark Triad traits and social interaction and their effect on professional skepticism.

Abstract Recent research suggests that adopting imprecise accounting standards elevates audit firm litigation exposure and could undermine auditor objectivity if audit firms respond by herding to industry norms. This paper reports the results of two experiments that demonstrate how audit firms can effectively mitigate the elevated litigation exposure without herding to industry norms by staffing engagements with recognized technical experts, using judgment frameworks and automated decision aids, and providing persuasive evidence of adherence to auditing standards. We find that judgment frameworks are particularly well‐suited for defending judgments under imprecise standards, and represent a cost‐effective alternative to using technical experts. However, our results also indicate that judgment frameworks may provide a safe harbor for relatively low‐quality judgments when those frameworks are used under precise standards. We discuss implications for audit firms, courts, and regulators that currently conduct or evaluate audits within and across jurisdictions where the precision of accounting standards varies considerably.