We examine the cost of liquidity in rates on CDs purchased by money market funds (MMFs). We find no evidence that rates vary directly with the size of CDs. However, we do find that large MMFs receive higher rates on large CDs than small MMFs. This suggests banks pay for (potential) liquidity.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.

We examine how community banks respond to liquidity shocks created by natural disasters. We address community banks’ responses to liquidity shocks due to their focused geographic and economic presence, which coincide with their communities’ exposure to the disasters and the ability of the local banks to meet their needs. We find that community banks respond to liquidity shocks by managing their balance sheet, rather than any single balance sheet account. In particular, we find that they respond to the liquidity needs of their communities by increasing loans as deposits are withdrawn.

This study examines the effects of the 2016 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reforms of Money Market Funds (MMFs) on the commercial paper market. By exploiting the differential time effect, we document a rise in the commercial paper (CP) rates. The rise in CP rates is more pronounced when the shadow floating NAV period starts and is similar across different types of commercial paper. Our cross-sectional analysis finds support for relationship-based lending in both commercial paper holdings and rates. We find that big issuers experienced a decrease and small issuers observed an increase in commercial paper outstanding from MMFs in the post-period. We find no evidence that rates vary across the size of the issuer in the post-period. Finally, financial institutions pay higher rates in the post-period than non-financial institutions.