Research on relationship lending pays only marginal attention to the role of loan managers’ trust in the managers of SMEs. Trust literature suggests that trust reduces agency costs. Thus, trust is expected to be positively related to the amount of short-term credit granted and negatively related to SMEs’ risk of being credit constrained. Results from six banks characterised by a German culture and three banks characterised by an Italian culture suggest that this is indeed the case: SMEs that enjoy a high level of trust from loan managers obtain more credit and are less credit constrained.

We explore the role of government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship—in the form of tax advantages and government support—in influencing the probability that entrepreneurial firms obtain bank credit and are not discouraged from applying for a loan. We propose that government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship should allow entrepreneurial firms to access more bank credit by reducing the risk incurred by lenders. We simultaneously estimate the probability of obtaining credit when a firm applies for a loan and the probability that the firm has been discouraged when it does not apply for a loan. In both cases we control for endogeneity. Our results are based on 18,872 observations (from the European Central Bank (ECB) SAFE dataset and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor – GEM) and show that government initiatives improve the probability of entrepreneurial firms obtaining bank credit but do not affect the probability of being discouraged from borrowing. The results also suggest that government initiatives fostering entrepreneurship are of most benefit to younger, smaller, high-growth, and more innovative firms that operate in contexts where the demand for, and accordingly the competition for, bank credit is strongest.