We document that most dispersion in marginal revenue products of inputs occurs across plants within firms rather than between firms. This is commonly thought to reflect misallocation: dispersion is “bad”. However, we show that eliminating frictions hampering internal capital markets in a multi-plant firm model may in fact increase productivity dispersion and raise output: dispersion can be “good”. This arises as firms optimally stagger investment activity across their plants over time to avoid raising costly external finance, instead relying on reallocating internal funds. The staggering in turn generates dispersion in marginal revenue products. We use U.S. Census data on multi-plant manufacturing firms to provide empirical evidence for the model mechanism and show a quantitatively important role for good dispersion. Since there is less scope for good dispersion in emerging economies, the difference in the degree of misallocation between emerging and developed economies looks more pronounced than previously thought.

The labor share in U.S. manufacturing declined from 61% in 1967 to 41% in 2012. The labor share of the typical U.S. manufacturing establishment, in contrast, rose by over 3 percentage points during the same period. Using micro-level data, we document five salient facts: (i) since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic reallocation of value added toward the lower end of the labor share distribution; (ii) this aggregate reallocation is not due to entry/exit, to “superstars” growing faster, or to large establishments lowering their labor shares, but is instead due to units whose labor share fell as they grew in size; (iii) low labor share (LL) establishments benefit from high revenue labor productivity, not low wages; (iv) they also enjoy a product price premium relative to their peers; and (v) they have only temporarily lower labor shares that rebound after five to eight years. This transient pattern has become more pronounced over time, and the dynamics of value added and employment are increasingly disconnected. Taken together, we interpret these facts as pointing to a significant role for demand-side forces.

Concave hiring rules imply that firms respond more to bad shocks than to good shocks. They provide a unified explanation for several seemingly unrelated facts about employment growth in macro- and microdata. In particular, they generate countercyclical movement in both aggregate conditional “macro” volatility and cross-sectional “micro” volatility, as well as negative skewness in the cross section and in the time series at different levels of aggregation. Concave establishment-level responses of employment growth to total factor productivity shocks estimated from census data induce significant skewness, movements in volatility, and amplification of bad aggregate shocks.

The relative size and inflexibility of labor expenses lead to a form of operating leverage, which we call labor leverage. We derive a set of conditions for the existence of labor leverage even when labor markets are frictionless. Our model provides theoretical support for the use of firm-level labor share as a measure of labor leverage. Using Compustat/CRSP and confidential Census data, we provide evidence for the existence and for the economic significance of labor leverage: high labor share firms have operating profits that are more sensitive to economic shocks and have higher expected returns.