Original issue premium (OIP) bonds are the norm in the US tax-exempt market but very rare in the taxable market. A tax subsidy helps explain this disparity. Unlike bonds issued at par or discount, the price of OIP bonds can fall and yet remain above par, providing secondary market buyers with more tax-exempt coupon and less taxable market discount gain. The subsidy for OIP bonds explains additional, previously undocumented empirical facts. In a calibration exercise, the subsidy’s expected cost to the U.S. Treasury is estimated at $1.7 billion per year.

Under standard assumptions, individuals and the government are indifferent between traditional tax-deferred retirement accounts and “front-loaded” (Roth) accounts. Adding investment fees to this benchmark, individuals are still indifferent, but the government is not. We show that under weak conditions firms charge equal percent fees under both systems, yielding higher dollar fees under Traditional. We estimate that tax deferral increases demand for asset management services by $3.8 trillion, costing the government $23.4 billion in annual fees. In a general equilibrium differentiated-product model, tax deferral produces a larger asset management industry, higher taxes, and lower social welfare.

We study secured lending contracts using a proprietary, loan‐level database of bilateral repurchase agreements containing groups of simultaneous loans backed by multiple tranches within a securitization. We show that lower‐quality loans (i.e., loans backed by lower‐rated collateral) have higher margins and spreads. We calibrate a model using collateral asset prices and find that lower‐quality loans are riskier despite the higher margins, yet cheaper for the borrower. This finding is consistent with a combination of lender optimism and reaching for yield. We also show that lower‐quality loans have longer maturity, consistent with models of rollover concerns with asymmetric information.