[This paper compares the information investors have about a firm's future earnings, as reflected in its stock price, to that of the firm's management, as reflected in its management earnings forecast. Stock returns in the preforecast and forecast announcement period are positively associated with management earnings forecast errors, indicating that stock prices contain information beyond that reflected in management forecasts. This phenomenon can occur if management does not issue its true forecast or if investors have information about earnings that management does not have. The first hypothesis, that management forecasts do not fully reflect management's information, implies that forecasts will be biased in a directional or nondirectional manner. This study conducts tests for directional bias and develops and conducts a test for nondirectional bias, using a sample of management forecasts occurring in years 1979-1983. The hypothesis that management forecasts are biased is only rejected for forecasts made in 1982. Given the magnitude of economic changes occurring in 1982, post-forecast information may well have been negative, causing the average forecast error in 1982 to differ from zero. In the other years studied, the hypothesis that management forecasts are biased is not rejected. The data, thus, suggest that stock prices reflect information beyond that in management earnings forecasts because investors access some information that managers do not.]

[This article analyzes the volume of trade in a multiperiod noisy rational expectations model. When traders receive private signals at the first trading date and are allowed a second round of trade, two types of equilibria exist. In the first, traders do not learn about the average private signal from the second round of trade, and all trade takes place at the first date. In the second, traders do learn from the second round, and trade thus takes place at both the first and second dates. The article characterizes volume when a public signal is disclosed at the second date.]

This paper provides evidence that firms signal their private information about future earnings by their choice of split factor. Split factors are increasing in earnings forecast errors, after controlling for differences in pre-split price and firm size. Further more, price changes at stock dividend and split announcements are significantly correlated with split factors, holding other factors constant, and with earnings forecast errors. These correlations suggest that management's choice of split factor signals private information about future earnings and that investors revise their beliefs about firm value accordingly. The analysis also suggests, however, that announcement returns are significantly correlated with split factors after controlling for earnings forecast errors. This suggests that earnings forecast errors measure management's private information about future earnings with error, that split factors signal other valuation-relevant attributes, or that a signaling explanation is incomplete.

This paper presents evidence that stock return prediction errors are less positively skewed in the time period surrounding accounting earnings report announcements than in a subsequent non- announcement period. Assuming that information available about firms in non-announcement periods depends on discretionary disclosure practices of firms and discretionary search for information by investors, the results suggest that earnings reports cause more extreme ‘bad news’ to be reflected in stock prices relative to discretionary sources of information.

Analyst following, Institutional investors, Information costs

This paper compares the information investors have about a firm's future earnings, as reflected in its stock price, to that of the firm's management, as reflected in its management earnings forecast. Stock returns in the preforecast and forecast announcement period are positively associated with management earnings forecast errors, indicating that stock prices contain information beyond that reflected in management forecasts. This phenomenon can occur if management does not issue its true forecast or if investors have information about earnings that management does not have. The first hypothesis, that management forecasts do not fully reflect management's information, implies that forecasts will be biased in a directional or nondirectional manner. This study conducts tests for directional bias and develops and conducts a test for nondirectional bias, using a sample of management forecasts occurring in years 1979-1983. The hypothesis that management forecasts are biased is only rejected for forecasts made in 1982. Given the magnitude of economic changes occurring in 1982, post-forecast information may well have been negative, causing the average forecast error in 1982 to differ from zero. In the other years studied, the hypothesis that management forecasts are biased is not rejected. The data, thus, suggest that stock prices reflect information beyond that in management earnings forecasts because investors access some information that managers do not.

This study provides a test of the relationship between changes in a firm's disclosure environment and its security price behavior. The initiation of interim reporting is examined. Theory suggests that the marginal information content of an annual report is greater when it has not been preceded by interim reports and that greater return variability will be observed at the annual report announcement date. The variance of returns upon release of the annual report is compared in the ‘annual-report-only’ and ‘annual-plus-quarterly-reports’ environments. As predicted by the theory, variability is significantly greater in the ‘annual-report-only’ environment.

[This paper documents a positive association between firms' tendencies to access capital markets and to disclose earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms attempt to mitigate potential consequences of differential information through disclosure. Our evidence also indicates that firms financing externally are not significantly more likely to forecast in the period shortly before an offering than at other times. Therefore, while firms that issue more capital tend to issue more forecasts, forces such as legal liability deter them from more frequent forecasting around the time of an actual offering. The paper also documents that management forecasts are not systematically greater than analysts' existing expectations, or than subsequently realized earnings. The data thus suggest that to the extent firms benefit from issuing favorable earnings forecasts when offering securities, competing forces such as potential legal liability and reputation costs deter them from issuing optimistic forecasts.]

We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.

Maureen McNichols, Patricia C. O'Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst Coverage, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35, Studies on Experts and the Application of Expertise in Accounting, Auditing, and Tax (1997), pp. 167-199