This study examines how inventory control and private information affect trading prices and volumes in a centralized interdealer foreign exchange (FX) market. Using exogenous variation from FX auctions conducted by the Colombian Central Bank (2008–2014), we analyze settlement data from the COP/USD spot market before and after each auction. Comparing dealers with differing inventory and information shocks, we find that those with reduced inventories increase net USD purchases and pay higher prices post-auction.

Most of the foreign exchange intervention literature overlooks the influence of market uncertainty when evaluating effectiveness. In this paper we take a fresh new look at how this uncertainty amplifies exchange rate effects. Our contribution is twofold. We first posit a partial equilibrium model with frictions to illustrate that when uncertainty is low, intervention is less effective, for agents are willing to bet against the central bank. Conversely, when uncertainty is high, intervention faces a weaker countervailing force from speculators and arbitragers. Second, we empirically test for the incremental effects of flimsy exchange rate fundamentals by using a sharp policy discontinuity in the way the Central Bank of Colombia intervened in the FX market. Our results indicate that market uncertainty increases depreciation of domestic currency in approximately 2 percentage points (pp) following central bank purchases of foreign currency and extends its duration in up to 4 weeks. Additionally, these purchases have an incremental effect in curbing exchange rate volatility in close to 5 pp.