Using a comprehensive dataset collected by the Federal Reserve, I find that over one-third of corporate loans issued by US banks are fully guaranteed by legal entities separate from borrowing firms. Using an empirical strategy that accounts for time-varying firm and lender effects, I find that the existence of a third-party credit guarantee is negatively related to loan risk, loan rate, and loan delinquency. Third-party credit guarantees alleviate the effect of collateral constraints in credit market. Firms (particularly smaller firms) that experience a negative shock to their asset values are less likely to use collateral and more likely to use credit guarantees in new borrowings.

Corporate loans increasingly have become an important part of portfolio management with the advent of a liquid and transparent secondary market. This paper examines the pricing of characteristics and betas in the cross-section of expected loan returns. Expected loan returns decrease with default beta. Default beta contains information not captured by rating or spread-to-maturity. Among loan characteristics, a 3-month formation momentum strategy earns a monthly premium of 122 bps. Momentum is prominent in loans issued by the lowest-rated borrowers.

We find that banks with capital and liquidity constraints are more likely to use credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments, including the credit derivative and the secondary loan markets. Relationship lenders and lead syndicate lenders are more likely to hold loans on their balance-sheets regardless of borrowers' riskiness. Finally, we find a separating equilibrium in the CRT market: loans to ex-ante riskier borrowers are more likely to be sold and loans to safer borrowers are more likely to be hedged with CDS. We view credit derivatives and loan sales as joint choice variables in determining the hedging instrument to use.

We study how financial distress of a significant customer impacts capital structure of suppliers. Using a sample of U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2013, we find that the suppliers of these firms increase their leverage ratio over the two years prior to the filing date. This change is economically significant and consistent with the bargaining power theory, which states that an increase in suppliers' debt decreases the surplus available for negotiations. Therefore, suppliers increase their financing leverage to fortify their bargaining power with significant, distressed customers. We also find evidence that suppliers reduce their leverage after the customer reorganizes its liabilities and capital structure in the Chapter 11 process, indicating a return to a previous status quo.

The impact of tax benefits of debt on firms remains an open question. The 2017 U.S. tax reform limited the tax advantage of debt for all firms except for small businesses with average sales below $25 million. A regression discontinuity design based on the exception threshold shows that, as tax benefits of debt shrink, corporate debt declines significantly, while equity does not increase sufficiently to offset the reduction. Treated firms also decrease their investments due to the higher cost of capital. Overall, we document a first-order role for tax incentives that affect the cost of capital in shaping corporate policies.

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.

Credit rationing by lending institutions has been the subject of much research in recent decades. Although there are some empirical indications, there is little theoretical justification about how various forms of credit rationing manifest themselves in credit markets. Understanding how these forms emerge in the market is particularly important for regulators in charge of monetary policy who play a crucial role in attaining economic and financial stability during crises and pandemics. This study first offers a theoretical decomposition of credit rationing by showing that three forms of equilibrium credit rationing can exist in the presence of contract heterogeneity. It then provides empirical evidence on each of the three rationing forms using micro-level data on small- and medium-sized enterprises collected by the European Central Bank over the period 2009–2019.

We examine the probability of exit for different types of investors in the syndicated loan market, as well as how the entry and exit of different types of investors is associated with changes in loan characteristics. Nonbanks, particularly CLOs, closed-end funds, and mutual funds, are more likely than bank lenders to exit the syndicate rather than to participate in the renegotiated loan. For mutual funds, greater net fund outflows imply a greater likelihood of exit, and this finding is consistent with nonbank lending creating greater systemic risk (Stein 2013). For most nonbanks, the likelihood of an exit increases if the financial condition of the borrower improves and the potential for higher spreads wanes. Controlling for borrower risk, the addition of most nonbank institutions, in contrast to banks, is accompanied by an increase in loan spreads, but no significant increase in the number or tightness of covenants.

Theories of competition typically predict a positive relationship between market concentration and prices. However, in loan markets, adverse selection can reverse this relationship as riskier borrowers become more likely to receive funding. Using supervisory data, we show that interest rates, borrower risk, and lending volume are higher in markets with more banks. We also create a novel measure of markup that is orthogonal to borrower risk, and find that, consistent with adverse selection, markups are higher after repeated borrowing relationships. Finally, we use a shock to large banks' lending costs to provide further support for the adverse selection channel.