This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, how subordinates to CEOs can discipline the CEOs' self-serving activities. I predict that because CEOs' self-serving activities hurt the subordinates through the subordinates' stakes in the firms, the subordinates who observe these activities will take actions that negatively affect the CEOs, and that in anticipation of such reactions by subordinates, the CEOs will limit their own misbehaviors. This disciplinary mechanism will become more effective when the CEOs' self-serving activities are more observable to subordinates. Further, the sensitivity of CEOs' self-serving activities to observability will increase (1) as the agency problem between CEOs and their subordinates intensifies, and (2) when external monitoring is less effective. The incentive pay for the subordinates will also decrease with the strength of external monitoring. Using a series of empirical tests, I find results that are largely consistent with my theoretical predictions. JEL Classifications: G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text, except for Glassdoor data, which are obtained by the author under a confidentiality agreement with Glassdoor, Inc.

Boards of directors play their role in corporate governance by advising and/or monitoring managers. In the corporate disclosure literature, prior research has documented directors' monitoring role, yet empirical evidence on directors' advising role is limited. Since the advising role often entails information transfer, we examine directors who concurrently serve as directors or executives in the firms' related industries (DRIs) and hence possess valuable information about the firms' external operating environment. We hypothesize and find that more DRIs on boards are associated with more accurate management forecasts. This association is stronger when firms face greater uncertainty, and holds in settings where DRIs are unlikely to monitor managers, suggesting a distinct advising role of DRIs. Our study highlights directors' role as information suppliers and advisors who help shape corporate voluntary disclosure.

We examine whether auditor political connections are associated with the SEC's oversight of audit clients . Specifically, we test whether auditors' political action committee contributions are associated with three SEC oversight actions: comment letters, investigations, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Consistent with higher political connections inducing heightened scrutiny from the SEC, we find that the clients of auditors with higher political connections are more likely to receive comment letters and face SEC investigations. However, conditional on SEC investigation, we find no association between auditor political connections and the issuance of AAERs. We consider heightened attention from investors and analysts toward audit clients as one possible mechanism leading to increased SEC scrutiny because auditor political connections could be perceived as a red flag. Using EDGAR downloads and the number of earnings forecast revisions, we document evidence consistent with the existence of this mechanism. These findings add to our understanding of how auditor political connections could influence SEC oversight over audit clients.

We explore whether managers’ strong desire for good performance distorts their expectations and, consequently, corporate investment efficiency. We find that managers overweight favorable information and underweight unfavorable information, resulting in optimistic earnings guidance. We construct an ex ante measure of optimism and show that greater optimism is associated with a lower inventory investment efficiency: Managers overinvest in inventory, resulting in lower inventory turnover and increased incidence and severity of inventory writedowns. We also find motivational optimism influences firms’ financial reporting and is associated with an increased incidence of financial misreporting. Our results are consistent with the psychology theory of motivated reasoning, which emphasizes the distortive effects of preferences on beliefs and judgments.

We use employee predictions of their companies' six-month business outlook from Glassdoor.com to assess the information content of employee social media disclosures. We find that average employee outlook is incrementally informative in predicting future operating performance. Its information content is greater when the disclosures are aggregated from a larger, more diverse, more knowledgeable employee base, consistent with the wisdom of crowds phenomenon. Average outlook predicts bad news events more strongly than good news events, suggesting that employee social media disclosures are relatively more important as a source of bad news. Consistent with the organizational theory, we find systematic differences in the quantity and nature of the information in employee disclosures when the disclosures are grouped based on employee attributes and job responsibilities. Finally, average outlook predicts future returns of firms that attract less attention by analysts and investors, suggesting that investors in these firms use outlook inefficiently.

Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007‐2017, we examine the impact of short sales on a firm's financial constraints. We develop three conceptual frameworks, the negative information effect, the undervaluation effect, and the deterrent effect, based on the prevailing theories and conduct an in-depth empirical analysis using the difference-in-differences, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable methods. Our findings suggest that: (1) Short sales generally worsen a firm's financial constraints by reducing its ability of raising cheap and overvalued external capital. (2) A shortable firm's financial constraints deteriorate more seriously in the case of higher credit risk or information asymmetry. (3) When a firm becomes shortable, its negative media coverage increases, external financing cost rises, and the amount of new external financing decreases. (4) The adverse impact of short sales on financial constraints is more pronounced for inefficient state-owned firms and mainly concentrates in the short term. Collectively, these results support the underlying logic of the negative information effect. However, further analysis shows that: (1) The deterrent effect also exists but is much weaker than the negative information effect. (2) The strength of the two effects will “wan and wax” with time or circumstances. Thus, the deterrent effect may outweigh the negative information effect by easing a firm's financial constraints in some cases, such as in the long term after short sales deregulation and when short sales magnitude is low or the managers are more sensitive to the decline of stock price. Our paper provides new insights into the impact of shorts sales on financial constraints, revealing some unique Chinese features compared to the US market and offering valuable lessons to other emerging markets.

We present the first comprehensive descriptive evidence on the labor market and personal consequences for audit professionals in the United States who are named in SEC or PCAOB enforcement actions. Three key findings emerge. First, between 38% and 73% of culpable auditors depart from their firms within one year after the enforcement event. These departure rates are three to four times higher compared with a sample of non‐culpable auditors. Second, 83% of culpable auditors departing from Big 4 accounting firms exit the profession, compared with 58% of a departing non‐culpable comparison group. In contrast, about 77% of the culpable auditors leaving non–Big 4 accounting firms remain in public accounting, compared with 51% of a departing non‐culpable comparison group. Third, using novel data on personal real estate holdings, we find that culpable auditors do not appear to engage in markedly different transactions around enforcement compared with a comparison sample of non‐culpable individuals.