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Polygyny, Fertility, and Savings

Journal of Political Economy 2005 113(6), 1341-1371
Sub‐Saharan Africa has a high incidence of polygyny. It is also the poorest region of the world. In this paper I ask whether banning polygyny could play any role for development. Using a quantitative model of polygyny, I find that enforcing monogamy lowers fertility, shrinks the spousal age gap, and reverses the direction of marriage payments. Polygyny leads to high bride‐prices to “ration” women, which makes buying wives and selling daughters a good investment, thus crowding out investment in physical assets. For reasonable parameter values, I find that banning polygyny decreases fertility by 40 percent, increases savings by 70 percent, and increases output per capita by 170 percent.

Optimal Age-based Policies for Pandemics: An Economic Analysis of Covid-19 and Beyond

Review of Economic Studies 2026
This paper investigates the importance of the age composition for pandemic policy design. To do so, it introduces an economic framework with age heterogeneity, individual choice, and incomplete information, emphasizing the value of testing. Calibrating the model to the US Covid-19 pandemic reveals an 80% reduction in the death toll due to voluntary actions and the lockdown implemented in the US. The optimal lockdown, however, is more stringent than what was implemented. Moreover, the social planner follows an asymmetric approach by locking down the young relatively more than the old. We highlight the role of testing in reducing deaths, lowering economic costs, and allowing for a less restrictive lockdown. A social planner would choose a faster ramp-up in testing capacity relative to what occurred in the US. We use the framework to provide insights into pandemics caused by different viruses (including the Spanish flu), and underline the influence of economic conditions on optimal policies.

Marriage Laws and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

American Economic Review 2006 96(2), 295-298
Many Sub-Saharan African countries are extremely poor. It has been argued that the marriage system -- in particular polygyny -- is one contributing factor to the lack of development in this region. Polygyny leads to low incentives to save, depressing the capital stock and output. Enforcing monogamy might seem like an obvious solution. However, such a law will have winners and losers. In this paper, we investigate the transition from a polygynous to a monogamous steady state.

Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth

Econometrica 2007 75(4), 1039-1071 open access
In this paper, we generalize the notion of Pareto-efficiency to make it applicable to environments with endogenous populations. Two efficiency concepts are proposed, P-efficiency and A-efficiency. The two concepts differ in how they treat potential agents that are not born. We show that these concepts are closely related to the notion of Pareto-efficiency when fertility is exogenous. We then prove versions of the first welfare theorem assuming that decision making is efficient within the dynasty. We discuss two sets of sufficient conditions for noncooperative equilibria of family decision problems to be efficient. These include the Barro and Becker model as a special case. Finally, we study examples of equilibrium settings in which fertility decisions are not efficient, and classify them into ones where inefficiencies arise inside the family and ones where they arise across families.

Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(4), 1541-1591
The nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women. Given that they took place long before women gained the right to vote, these changes amounted to a voluntary renunciation of power by men. In this paper, we investigate men's incentives for sharing power with women. In our model, women's legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives. We show that men face a trade-off between the rights they want for their own wives (namely none) and the rights of other women in the economy. Men prefer other men's wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women's rights increases educational investments in children. We show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital. We corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women's rights in England and the United States.

The Democratization of Credit and the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies

Review of Economic Studies 2016 83(4), 1673-1710
Financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers' risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer. Innovations that ameliorate asymmetric information or reduce this fixed cost have large extensive margin effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers. This results in more defaults and borrowing, and increased dispersion of interest rates. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances and Federal Reserve Board interest rate data, we find evidence supporting these predictions. Specifically, the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled while the “new” cardholders of the late 1980s and 1990s had riskier observable characteristics than existing cardholders. Our calculations suggest that these new cardholders accounted for over 20% of the rise in bank credit card debt and delinquencies between 1989 and 1998.

Status Externalities in Education and Low Birth Rates in Korea

American Economic Review 2024 114(6), 1576-1611
South Koreans appear to be preoccupied with their offspring's education and also have the lowest total fertility rate in the world. We propose a novel theory with status externalities and endogenous fertility connecting these facts, motivated by novel empirical evidence on private education spillovers. Using a quantitative model calibrated to Korea, we find that fertility would be 28 percent higher without the externality. We explore the effects of government policy: a pro-natal transfer or an education tax can increase fertility and reduce education spending. An education tax of 22 percent together with moderate pro-natal transfers maximizes the current generation's welfare.

Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start

American Economic Review 2007 97(1), 402-418 open access
Consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck, but, by driving up interest rates, makes life-cycle smoothing more difficult. We argue that to assess this trade-off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features: life-cycle component, idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty, and expense uncertainty (exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets). We find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules. More persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable. Larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect. Our findings suggest the current US bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values.

An Equilibrium Model of the African HIV/AIDS Epidemic

Econometrica 2019 87(4), 1081-1113 open access
Twelve percent of the Malawian population is HIV infected. Eighteen percent of sexual encounters are casual. A condom is used a third of the time. To analyze the Malawian epidemic, a choice‐theoretic general equilibrium search model is constructed. In the developed framework, people select between different sexual practices while knowing the inherent risk. The calibrated model is used to study several policy interventions, namely, ART, circumcision, better condoms, and the treatment of other STDs. The efficacy of public policy depends upon the induced behavioral changes and equilibrium effects. The framework complements the insights from epidemiological studies and small‐scale field experiments.