This study investigates the dynamic interdependence of the major stock markets in Latin America. Using data from 1995 to 2000, we examine the stock market indexes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The index level series are non-stationary and so we employ cointegration analysis and error correction vector autoregressions (VAR) techniques to model the interdependencies. We find that there is one cointegrating vector which appears to explain the dependencies in prices. The results are robust to sensitivity tests based on translating indexes to US dollars (i.e., a common currency for all the markets) and to partitioning the sample into periods before and after the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997 and 1998, respectively. Our results suggest that the potential for diversifying risk by investing in different Latin American markets is limited.

Investment institutions with substantial shareholdings in a firm have the resources and incentives to monitor and influence management decisions. Whether the institutions actually monitor and exert pressure on managers is an empirical question. Previous studies have reported mixed results on this question. We examine whether large institutional shareholdings in a firm deter earnings management by its managers when those executives otherwise have incentives to increase or decrease reported profits. Using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings management, we find that the presence of large institutional shareholdings inhibit managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the managers' desired level or range of profits. The evidence is consistent with institutional investors monitoring and constraining the self-serving behavior of corporate managers.