In some cultures vast personal wealth is lauded whereas in others, it is viewed with suspicion and contempt. In recent years, a super rich elite of business people has emerged in China, and, given the country's cultural and socialist past, we believe that people are more likely to react negatively to reports of conspicuous wealth. To test our arguments, we examine the reactions to and consequences of China's entrepreneurs being included on the Hurun Rich List. We find negative consequences for stock market traded firms controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs: stock prices decline, government subsidies are reduced, and the named entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated. These effects are strongest in rent-seeking industries and are mitigated by philanthropy.

State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.

ABSTRACT Family firms are characterized by less separation between ownership and control (Type 1 agency problem), but greater conflict of interest between controlling insiders and non-controlling outside investors (Type 2 agency problem). Although strong board governance is known to decrease the Type 1 agency problem, its effectiveness in mitigating the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem has not been well documented in the literature. We show that strongly governed family firms are more likely to choose specialist auditors and exhibit higher earnings quality than nonfamily firms. Weakly governed family firms demand lower audit effort and exhibit earnings quality that is no different from that of nonfamily firms. Within family firms, we show that strongly governed family firms choose higher quality audits in the form of a greater use of specialist auditors and higher audit efforts, and exhibit higher earnings quality than other family firms. These findings provide consistent evidence that strong board governance can effectively mitigate the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem on financial reporting and transparency in family firms. Data Availability: The data used are available from the public sources identified in the study.