This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, the author finds that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement-period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.

This paper provides evidence that repurchase tender offer announcements convey favorable information about the level and riskiness of future earnings. We show that analysts revise their forecasts of earnings per share upward following repurchase announcements. Repurchase announcement stock price reactions are positively correlated with revisions in short-term forecasts, but not correlated with revisions in long-term forecasts. Thus, the information is primarily about transitory changes in earnings. We also provide evidence that equity betas decline after repurchases. Our findings indicate that the equity beta decreases are due to decreases in the underlying riskiness of the firm's assets.

This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm‐specific.

This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.