This paper examines 472 securities that were listed on Nasdaq and moved to the NYSE or Amex. When Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes, bid-ask spreads are large and decline dramatically with exchange listing. When market makers use both odd and even eighths, spreads are smaller and decline only slightly with exchange listing. The large spreads observed when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighths cannot be explained by security-specific characteristics. Instead, the results support the conclusion that the avoidance of odd-eighth quotes is used as a coordination device among Nasdaq market makers to maintain supra-competitive bid-ask spreads.

This study examines the ex-dividend day behavior of common stock prices before the enactment of the federal income tax. On ex-dividend days during the pre-tax period, stock prices fell, on average, by the full amount of the dividend. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that (i) investors in the pre-tax period value dividends and capital gains as perfect substitutes and (ii) the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains has since caused investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends in relation to capital gains.

We examine the effects of trading after hours on the amount and timing of price discovery over the 24-hour day. A high volume of liquidity trade facilitates price discovery. Thus prices are more efficient and more information is revealed per hour during the trading day than after hours. However, the low trading volume after hours generates significant, albeit inefficient, price discovery. Individual trades contain more information after hours than during the day. Because information asymmetry declines over the day, price changes are larger, reflect more private information, and are less noisy before the open than after the close.

We examine the proportion of a stock's cumulative price change that occurs in each trade-size category, using transactions data for a sample of NYSE firms. Although the majority of trades are small, most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category, and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders' private information.

We analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or Amex corporations. These blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement exchange price. We argue that the premiums, which average 20%, reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of his voting power. The premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variance, and large cash holdings.

Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.

This paper examines the intraday market response to announcements of new equity issues. For fifteen minutes following the announcement, there is abnormally high volume and a -1.3% average return. There is also a small, but significant, negative average return in the hour before the announcement. Issue size, intended use of proceeds, and estimated profitability of new investment are uncorrelated with the announcement effect. After the issuance of new shares, there is a significant price recovery of 1.5%. This evidence is inconsistent with many theoretical rationales for the negative market reaction to new equity issue announcements.

We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting‐cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long‐term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short‐term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.

The authors provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Their evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. The authors find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. The authors find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.