We provide evidence that corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions, which induces a spurious relation between measures of financial policy and many commonly used tax proxies. Using a forward-looking estimate of before-financing corporate marginal tax rates, we document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates, and a positive relation between debt levels and tax rates. This is the first unambiguous evidence supporting the hypothesis that low tax rate firms lease more, and have lower debt levels, than high tax rate firms.

Capital structure choice based on costs associated with asymmetric information is examined in order to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order and trade-off theories. In the model, both the face value of debt and the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants are chosen as part of the financial structure, allowing a more complete characterization of this decision. Debt structure choice balances ex ante adverse selection against ex post moral hazard, providing a natural integration of the pecking order and trade-off theories and the development of interesting empirical implications.

We examine the impact of explicitly incorporating a measure of debt capacity in recent tests of competing theories of capital structure. Our main results are that if external funds are required, in the absence of debt capacity concerns, debt appears to be preferred to equity. Concerns over debt capacity largely explain the use of new external equity financing by publicly traded firms. Finally, we present evidence that reconciles the frequent equity issues by small, high-growth firms with the pecking order. After accounting for debt capacity, the pecking order theory appears to give a good description of financing behavior for a large sample of firms examined over an extended time period.

We examine the provision of termination fee clauses in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. Target-payable fees are observed more frequently when bidding is costly and the potential for information expropriation by third parties is significant. Fee provisions appear to benefit target shareholders through higher deal completion rates and greater negotiated takeover premiums. We conclude that target-payable fees serve as an efficient contracting device, rather than a means by which to deter competitive bidding. Bidder fee provisions appear to be used to secure target wealth gains in deals with higher costs associated with negotiation and bid failure.

We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and/or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand‐alone firms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes.

Spot power prices are volatile and since electricity cannot be economically stored, familiar arbitrage‐based methods are not applicable for pricing power derivative contracts. This paper presents an equilibrium model implying that the forward power price is a downward biased predictor of the future spot price if expected power demand is low and demand risk is moderate. However, the equilibrium forward premium increases when either expected demand or demand variance is high, because of positive skewness in the spot power price distribution. Preliminary empirical evidence indicates that the premium in forward power prices is greatest during the summer months.

J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon, Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 345-370

We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.

This paper examines the relationship between book‐to‐market equity, distress risk, and stock returns. Among firms with the highest distress risk as proxied by Ohlson's (1980) O‐score, the difference in returns between high and low book‐to market securities is more than twice as large as that in other firms. This large return differential cannot be explained by the three‐factor model or by differences in economic fundamentals. Consistent with mispricing arguments, firms with high distress risk exhibit the largest return reversals around earnings announcements, and the book‐to‐market effect is largest in small firms with low analyst coverage.

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well-known hump-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem, we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model. The unfortunate conclusion is that, at least in the ownership–performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias.