Stock splits should have no effect on firm value in perfect capital markets, yet stock prices increase on split announcements. The two traditional explanations are information signaling and improved liquidity for shares that trade at lower prices. We investigate these explanations by studying splits of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) that are not associated with splits in their home-country stock, and which represent unique illustrations of the effect of liquidity. We interpret our findings as supportive of the liquidity explanation of stock split announcement effects.

This paper tests Baron's (1982) model of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. That model relies on information asymmetries between issuers and underwriters and predicts that offer prices will be lower than would prevail in the absence of asymmetric information. We examine the initial public offerings of 38 investment banks that went public in the period 1970–1987 and participated in the distribution of their own securities. We find that contrary to the implication of Baron's model such self-marketed offerings are characterized by statistically significant underpricing comparable to that of other IPOs.

This paper studies senior management compensation policy in seventy-seven publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one-third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 percent less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36 percent more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.

This paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one‐third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36% more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.

This paper is a report on seventy-two firms that went public since 1983, but previously underwent a full or divisional levereged buy-out. Accounting measures of performance reveal significant improvements in profitability, which resulted mainly from these firms' ability to reduce costs. Firms experience dramatic increases in leverage at the levereged buyout, but the leverage ratios are gradually reduced. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the change in the governance structure of these firms towards more concentrated residual claims created a new organizational structure that is more efficient than its predecessor.

This paper is a report on 72 firms which went public since 1983 but previously underwent a full or divisional LBO. Accounting measures of performance reveal significant improvements in profitability which resulted mainly from these firms' ability to reduce costs. Firms experience dramatic increases in leverage at the LBO, but the leverage ratios are gradually reduced. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the change in the governance structure of these firms towards more concentrated residual claims created a new organizational structure which is more efficient than its predecessor.

This paper examines the wealth effects to parent company shareholders around the announcement of divisional management buyouts. Despite the relative absence of “arm's-length” bargaining between buyer and seller, there is no evidence that divisional management buyouts result in reductions in parent company share prices. Instead, small but statistically significant wealth gains are found during the two-day period surrounding the buyout announcement. This evidence suggests that divisional buyouts reallocate ownership of corporate assets to higher valued uses and that parent company stockholders share in the expected benefits of this change in ownership structure.

This paper examines the wealth effects to parent company shareholders around the announcement of divisional management buyouts. Despite the relative absence of “arm's‐length” bargaining between buyer and seller, there is no evidence that divisional management buyouts result in reductions in parent company share prices. Instead, small but statistically significant wealth gains are found during the two‐day period surrounding the buyout announcement. This evidence suggests that divisional buyouts reallocate ownership of corporate assets to higher valued uses and that parent company stockholders share in the expected benefits of this change in ownership structure.