We isolate the information channel of peer effects in consumption in a setting that excludes a role for common shocks or social pressure—a spending panel paired with crowdsourced information about anonymous “peers” elicited at different times. Consumers converge to peers’ spending, and more so when peer signals are more informative. Convergence is asymmetric: within 12 months of information provision, overspenders close 17% and underspenders 5% of their gap relative to peers. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to peer groups in an instrumental-variable strategy and implement an experiment for external validity. Our results are consistent with information-based theories of overconsumption.

“Big G” typically refers to aggregate government spending on a homogeneous good. We confront this notion with five facts for the universe of federal purchases. First, they are volatile and account for the largest part of the short-run variation in total spending. Second, the origin of their variation is granular. Third, purchases are subject to procurement and bidding. Fourth, they are concentrated in long-term contracts. Fifth, their composition is biased toward sectors in which private sector prices are sticky. We develop a two-sector New Keynesian model consistent with these facts and find where the government spends is key for aggregate effects.

We use randomized treatments that provide different types of information about the first and/or second moments of future economic growth to generate exogenous changes in the perceived macroeconomic uncertainty of treated households. The effects on their spending decisions relative to an untreated control group are measured in follow-up surveys. Our results indicate that, after taking into account first moments, higher macroeconomic uncertainty induces households to significantly and persistently reduce their total monthly spending in subsequent months. Changes in spending are broad based across spending categories and apply to larger durable good purchases as well.