This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of traditional securities by well-established firms. Standard moral hazard models predict that equity, debt, and warrants are almost never optimal financing instruments. I show that issuing these securities is, nevertheless, nearly optimal: the issuer would gain very little by using non-traditional securities instead. Combined with equity, one debt issue (without multiple layers of seniority) and one warrant issue (without multiple exercise prices) suffice to achieve near optimality. The near optimality of traditional financing depends crucially on the issuer's ability to use warrants in addition to debt and equity.

We examine insider trading in specialist and dealer markets, using the trades of stock brokers who had advance copies of a stock analysis column in Business Week magazine. We find that increases in price and volume occur after informed trades. During informed trading, market makers decrease depth. Depth falls more on the NYSE and Amex than on the Nasdaq. Spreads increase on the NYSE and Amex, but not on the Nasdaq. We find none of these pre-release changes in a nontraded control sample of stocks mentioned in the column. Our results show that insider trading has a negative impact on market liquidity; depth is an important tool to manage asymmetric information risk; and specialist markets are better at detecting informed trades.

This paper investigates the importance of market incompleteness by comparing the rates of risk aversion estimated from complete and incomplete markets environments. For the incomplete-markets case, we use consumption data for the 50 US states. We find that the rate of risk aversion under the incomplete-markets setup is much lower. Furthermore, including the second and third moments of the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth in the pricing kernel lowers the estimate of risk aversion. These findings suggest that market incompleteness ought to be seen as an important component of solutions to the equity premium puzzle.