This note characterizes the nature of Ricardian-equivalence failure when either the old generation's or the young generation's income is uncertain and the nonnegativity constraint on bequests is binding in some states of nature. Assuming a positive third derivative of the utility function, the same condition needed for precautionary savings,' it is shown that the degree of failure of Ricardian equivalence is greater when the corner has to do with parental poverty than when the corner has to do with children's wealth. The reason is that in corners associated with parental poverty (and therefore lower parental consumption) marginal utility is more sensitive to extra consumption, leading to a higher marginal propensity to consume in the first period. Consequently, government transfers cause a substantial reduction of precautionary savings in poor corners, in contrast to rich corners, where precautionary savings are only slightly affected.

This paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government-spending/GDP ratios in the OECD countries. An empirical framework that includes both long-run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering 1975–1998. The main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending/GDP ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior: the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions. The long-run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2% of GDP. Also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending (government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and capital expenditure), as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness.

Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Comment by Momi Dahan and Michel Strawczynski. Published in volume 90, issue 3, pages 681-686 of American Economic Review, June 2000