This paper studies learning among coworkers when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show that when workers are not fully informed on the global shape of the production function, (1) their effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed and (2) changing incentives can trigger this learning process. We test this prediction using personnel data from an egg production plant in Peru. Exploiting a sudden change in the contract parameters, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.

This article shows how input heterogeneity triggers productivity spillovers at the workplace. In an egg production plant in rural Peru, workers produce output combining effort with inputs of heterogeneous quality. Exploiting variation in the productivity of inputs assigned to workers, we find evidence of a negative causal effect of an increase in coworkers¿ daily output on own output and its quality. We show theoretically and suggest empirically that the effect captures free riding among workers, which originates from the way the management informs its dismissal decisions. Our study and results show that input heterogeneity and information on input quality contribute to determine the shape of incentives and have implications for human resource management, production management, and the interaction between the two. Counterfactual analyses show that processing information on inputs or changing their allocation among workers can generate significant productivity gains.

Effective risk management in pension funds requires the use of appropriate long-term risk and performance indicators. However, Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans currently rely on short-term metrics that don't align with the retirement income goals of beneficiaries. Against this backdrop, we introduce a funding ratio measure for DC plans defined as the plan assets divided by accrued benefits derived from any given (defined) stream of contributions. The funding ratio's denominator is the present value of the total retirement income achievable if all contributions had been invested in fully amortizing fixed-income portfolios called retirement bonds. We also use the retirement bonds to introduce a class of target-income strategies that can effectively reduce income risk as retirement approaches, but also secure minimum funding ratio levels. These simple asset allocation rules strongly dominate the standard target-date fund strategies routinely used by DC plans, in terms of retirement outcomes for beneficiaries.