We identify the effects of negative rates on bank behavior using difference-in-differences identification. First, we find that going negative can interrupt not only the pass-through from policy to deposit but also to mortgage rates. To preserve their deposit franchise, banks finance negative deposit with increased mortgage spreads, the more the bigger their market power. Second, negative rates on reserves induce banks to cut some reserves without replacement and replace others with riskier assets. Together with increased mortgage spreads, balance sheet restructuring preserves profits but risk-taking increases. Third, pass-through interruption and risk-taking can be reduced through tiered remuneration.

Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) face additional capital requirements and closer supervision. We study how closer supervision affects corporate credit supply and investigate consequences for firms. GSIB designations reduce lending on average by 5.9% but to risky firms by 7.2%. The consequences are lower asset, sales, and investment growth, especially among high-risk borrowers, and reduced R&D expenditures among all GSIB-dependent firms. Closer supervision therefore reduces banks' risk-taking but has potentially unintended implications for firms' ability to finance innovation, which seems to crucially depend on bank credit. The supervision-induced effects are larger than those attributed to GSIB-specific capital surcharges.