We investigate whether and how an exogenous and unprecedented improvement in non-U.S. firms' financial-reporting quality affects post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). We find that PEAD declines after the information shock, and this decrease is more pronounced for firms with fewer concurrent earnings announcements, greater institutional holdings, and lower limits to arbitrage. In addition, the decrease in PEAD is driven by firms with greater changes in financial reporting, an increase in analyst forecast accuracy and institutional ownership, and a decrease in limits to arbitrage. These findings support the mispricing explanation of PEAD, in particular the limited attention hypothesis, in an international setting.

This paper compares the value of political ties and market credibility in China by examining the consequence of corporate scandals. We categorize Chinese corporate scandals by whether the scandal is primarily associated with the destruction of (i) the firm's political networks (political scandals), (ii) the firm's market credibility (market scandals), or (iii) both (mixed scandals). Consistent with our hypothesis that scandals signaling the destruction of political ties are associated with greater losses in firm value than scandals signaling the destruction of market credibility, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to political and mixed scandals than to market scandals. In addition, the greater negative market reactions associated with political and mixed scandals are primarily driven by firms that rely more on political networks. We also find that, compared to market scandals, political and mixed scandals lead to larger decreases in operating performance, greater reduction in loans from state‐owned banks, and higher departure of political directors.

We investigate whether and how an exogenous and unprecedented improvement in non-U.S. firms' financial-reporting quality affects post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). We find that PEAD declines after the information shock, and this decrease is more pronounced for firms with fewer concurrent earnings announcements, greater institutional holdings, and lower limits to arbitrage. In addition, the decrease in PEAD is driven by firms with greater changes in financial reporting, an increase in analyst forecast accuracy and institutional ownership, and a decrease in limits to arbitrage. These findings support the mispricing explanation of PEAD, in particular the limited attention hypothesis, in an international setting.

We test whether mandatory IFRS adoption affects firm-level “crash risk,” defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. We separately analyze nonfinancial firms and financial firms because IFRS is likely to affect their crash risk differently. We find that IFRS adoption decreases crash risk among nonfinancial firms, especially among firms in poor information environments and in countries where IFRS adoption results in larger and more credible changes to local GAAP. In contrast, IFRS adoption has no effect on crash risk for financial firms, on average, but decreases crash risk among firms less affected by IFRS's fair value provisions, and increases crash risk among banks in countries with weak banking regulations. Overall, our results are consistent with the increased transparency from IFRS adoption broadly reducing crash risk among nonfinancial firms, but more selectively among financial firms, and with financial regulations playing a complementary role in implementing IFRS among financial firms.