We examine whether CDS prices around the Credit Crisis can be explained with Merton’s model. First we invert the model with market prices to reveal skewed volatility smiles over the whole 2005–2012 period. Then we calibrate the model to pre-Crisis data in two novel ways that allow for skewness, one based on equity-index options (MEIV) and the other on the sensitivity of CDS prices to equity volatility (MSKEW). In out-of-sample forecasts both calibrations match the in-Crisis peak of prices, but the second is better at capturing the systematic component of prices thereafter. Average CDS prices remain at twice their pre-Crisis level long after that event; the MSKEW calibration demonstrates that this is due to extra idiosyncratic risks, which are important for some firms but have negligible impact on others.

Using a novel dataset, we study intraday trades of overnight general collateral repurchase agreements (repos) on Italian government bonds. We focus both on repos cleared by central counterparties (CCPs) and traded bilaterally. Intraday bond supply, liquidity and duration significantly affect the spread of repo rates over the European Central Bank (ECB) deposit rate, but after the ECB quantitative easing interventions this impact is much reduced. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the increase in margins further deteriorates repo costs, creating a negative procyclical effect. Once we control for the impact of margin costs, CCP-based repos do not appear to be significantly cheaper than bilateral repos. We also show that bonds with lower liquidity and specialness, greater supply and longer duration are more likely to be selected as collateral. However, during the crisis, CCP-repo borrowers choose collateral bonds with higher liquidity and lower duration to reduce margin and repo trading costs.

We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade reporting started.

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.

We study the relation between firm financial stability and gender diversity in leadership and highlight its dependence on the initial financial conditions of the firm and the role played by the women leaders. Consistent with the glass cliff and the upper echelon theories, we find that close-to-default firms are more likely to appoint women top executives and that under their leadership, subsequent firms’ risk of default decreases in the short to medium term. In parallel, independent women directors are not associated with firms’ past credit risk, and their presence is more likely to increase the firm’s subsequent default risk, as established by the tokenism and signaling theory. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and endogeneity corrections.

We examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the credit risk of companies around the world. We find that increased infection rates affect firms more adversely as reflected by the wider increase in their credit default swap (CDS) spreads if they are larger, more leveraged, closer to default, have worse governance and more limited stakeholder engagement, and operate in more highly exposed industries. We observe that country-level determinants such as GDP, political stability, foreign direct investment, and commitment to crisis management (income support, health and lockdown policies) also affect the sensitivity of CDS spreads to COVID-19 infection rates. A negative amplification effect exists for firms with high default probability in countries with fiscal constraints. A direct comparison between global CDS and stock markets reveals that the CDS market prices in a distinct set of corporate traits and government policies in pandemic times.