We investigate industry response to cyclical variations in demand. Production units that embody the newest process and product innovations are continuously being created, and outdated units are being destroyed. Although outdated units are the most likely to turn unprofitable and be scrapped in a recession, they can be "insulated" from the fall in demand by a reduction in creation. The structure of adjustment costs plays a determinant role in the responsiveness of those two margins. The calibrated model matches the relative volatilities of the observed manufacturing job creation and destruction series, and their asymmetries over the cycle.

We propose a framework for understanding episodes of vigorous economic expansion and extreme asset valuations. We interpret this phenomenon as a high-valuation equilibrium with a low cost of capital based on optimism about future funding. The key ingredient for such equilibrium is feedback from increased growth to a decline in the long-run cost of capital. This feedback arises when an expansion comes with technological progress in the capital sector, when fiscal rules generate procyclical fiscal surpluses, when the rest of the world has lower expansion potential or high saving needs, and when financial constraints are relaxed by the expansion itself.

The observation that liquidations are concentrated in recessions has long been the subject of controversy. One view holds that liquidations are beneficial in that they result in increased restructuring. Another view holds that this rise in restructuring is costly since liquidations are privately inefficient and essentially wasteful. This paper proposes an alternative perspective. On the basis of a combination of theory with empirical evidence on gross job flows and on financial and labour market rents, we find that, cumulatively, recessions result in reduced rather than increased restructuring, and that this is likely to be socially costly once we consider inefficiencies on both the creation and destruction margins.

Specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. Rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences. Resources are underutilized, factor markets are segmented, production suffers from technological “sclerosis,” job creation and destruction are unbalanced, recessions are excessively sharp, and expansions run into bottlenecks. While, depending on the shock, expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization, recessions should typically be softened. In the long run, institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation. Technology choice will also be affected, with the appropriated factor partially “excluding” the other from production to reduce appropriation.