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Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

Journal of Financial Stability 2013 9(4), 705-719 open access
I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.

Bank capital and the cost of equity

Journal of Financial Stability 2021 53, 100843
Using a sample of publicly listed banks from 62 countries over the 1991–2017 period, we investigate the impact of capital on banks’ cost of equity. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that more equity in the capital mix leads to a fall in firms’ costs of equity, we find that better capitalized banks enjoy lower equity costs. Our baseline estimations indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s equity-to-assets ratio lowers its cost of equity by about 18 basis points. Our results also suggest that the form of capital that investors value the most is sheer equity capital; other forms of capital, such as Tier 2 regulatory capital, are less (or not at all) valued by investors. Additionally, our main finding that capital has a negative effect on banks’ cost of equity holds in both developed and developing countries. The results of this paper provide the missing evidence in the debate on the effects of higher capital requirements on banks’ funding costs.

Stock extreme illiquidity and the cost of capital

Journal of Banking & Finance 2020 112, 105281
We examine the relationship between stock extreme illiquidity and the implied cost of capital for firms from 45 countries. We document robust evidence that firms whose stocks have a greater potential for extreme illiquidity realizations suffer from higher cost of capital. A one standard deviation increase in a stock's liquidity tail index leads to a rise of 30 basis points in the cost of equity. The reported evidence for stock extreme illiquidity is independent of the systematic extreme liquidity risk and extends to alternative cost-percent liquidity proxies. We further find that this relation is stronger in periods of down markets and high volatility and is weaker in environments with better information quality and stronger investor protection.