This study provides a theoretical framework and experimental evidence on how managers' disclosure decisions affect their credibility with investors. I find that in the short-term, more forthcoming disclosure has a positive effect on management's reporting credibility, especially when management is forthcoming about negative news. However, these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the long-term, managers who report positive earnings news are rated as having higher reporting credibility than managers who report negative earnings news, regardless of their previous disclosure decisions.

Managers often provide self-serving disclosures that blame poor financial performance on temporary external factors. Results of an experiment conducted with 124 financial analysts suggest that when analysts perceive such disclosures as plausible, they provide higher earnings forecasts and stock valuations than if the explanation had not been provided. However, we also show that these disclosures can backfire if analysts find them implausible. Specifically, implausible explanations that blame poor performance on temporary external factors lead analysts to provide lower earnings forecasts and assess a higher cost of capital than if the explanation had not been provided.

This paper proposes and tests a risk model that explains how investors perceive financial risks. The model combines conventional decision-theory variables—probabilities and outcomes—with behavioral variables from psychology research by Slovic (1987), such as the extent to which a risky item is new, causes worry, and is controllable. To test our model, we conduct two studies in which M.B.A. students judge the risk of a broad range of financial items. Our results indicate that both the decisiontheory variables and Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables are important in explaining investors' risk judgments. Further, we demonstrate that information about the amount of potential loss outcome contained within mandated risk disclosures not only directly influences risk judgments, but also indirectly affects such judgments via its effect on some of Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables. By identifying this unintended consequence of current risk disclosures, these results have the potential to influence the way accounting regulators, firm managers, and academic researchers think about risk disclosure.