A countertrade contract ties an export to an import. Usually, countertrade is criticized as a form of bilateralism and reciprocity and thus as an inefficient form of international exchange. In this paper we argue that there are circumstances in which the tying of two technologically unrelated trade flows may be efficiency-enhancing. We show that countertrade can be an efficient institution in international trade that solves moral-hazard problems and restores creditworthiness of highly indebted countries. We test the implications of our model using a sample of 230 countertrade contracts.

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire-building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.

A countertrade contract ties an export to an import. Usually, countertrade is criticized as a form of bilateralism and reciprocity and, thus, as an inefficient form of international exchange. In this paper, the authors argue that there are circumstances in which the tying of two technologically unrelated trade flows may be efficiency-enhancing. They show that countertrade can be an efficient institution in international trade that solves moral-hazard problems and restores creditworthiness of highly indebted countries. The authors test the implications of their model using a sample of 230 countertrade contracts.

This paper shows that venture capital investment in start-ups increases innovation of established companies in technologically related fields due to knowledge spillovers. To address endogeneity issues, we instrument R&D expenditures of established companies with state-level R&D tax credits (Bloom, Schankerman, & Van Reenen, 2013) and venture capital investment with past fundraising of private equity buyout funds (Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). Exploring the mechanism, we show that the patents of VC-financed start-ups are on average of higher quality, more novel, and less protected by intellectual property rights than those of established firms, leading to significantly larger spillovers. This knowledge transfer between companies is enhanced by mobile start-up inventors.

Multinational firms with operations in high-tax countries can benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens, though this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20.4% of German multinational firms have any tax haven affiliates. Among German manufacturing firms, a 1 percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 2.3% greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax avoidance incentives and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. The relationship is less strong for firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income.