Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally-reported and subsequently-revised financial variables, we study accounting restatements. Our results indicate the worse a bank's financial condition, the more likely it is for originally-reported data to understate financial losses. Also, we find supervisory exams have an important role in uncovering financial problems and prompting accounting restatements to correct loss underreporting. While revisions are directly related to financial difficulties, exam-based restatements are evident at even the earliest stages of deterioration, indicating substantial accounting misstatements—at both banks and other types of companies—can occur well outside severe business circumstances.

Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally reported and subsequently revised financial variables, we find adverse revisions to accounting statements are associated with downgrades in supervisory ratings. To assess the financial significance of the revisions, we compare the ability of the original and revised data to map into exam ratings. The relationship between accounting data and exam results is significantly stronger for revised data than for real-time data. Our findings document significant differences between real-time and revised banking data, highlight the auditing role of bank exams, and provide a more realistic assessment of early warning model accuracy.

Recent theories based on sequential financing and information signaling reveal a special role for warrants. Data from initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock-warrant units have been used to test the theories, and we extend the analysis to seasoned offerings. Consistent with predictions from both families of theories, we find that issues made by smaller and younger firms are more likely to involve stock-warrant units, and firms with greater stock price volatility are more likely to issue units in seasoned offerings. Moreover, firms with relatively high levels of long-term debt, and those whose issues are underwritten by less prestigious underwriters are more likely to employ stock-warrant unit financing. Consistent with information signaling, we find that firms with high managerial ownership are more likely to issue units. Firms that include warrants in their stock offerings are predicted to have experienced higher abnormal stock returns than if they had issued shares alone. Thus, consistent with both theoretical explanations, some firms can reduce capital costs by adding warrants to shares in seasoned offerings.

Regional Workshops to Improve the Teaching Skills of Economics Faculty by Rae Jean B. Goodman, Mark Maier and Robert L. Moore. Published in volume 93, issue 2, pages 460-462 of American Economic Review, May 2003