This study examines the relations between earnings management by firms offering seasoned equity issues and the pricing of their offers. We hypothesize that seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms that employ aggressive accounting decisions also more aggressively push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in the degree of underpricing. Consistent with our prediction (the issuer's greed hypothesis), evidence indicates that SEO firms that make opportunistic accounting decisions issue new shares at inflated prices. Our findings remain robust after controlling for other determinants of SEO underpricing and the possible endogeneity of pricing and earnings management.

In this study, we examine the effect of clients' real activities manipulation (RAM) on auditors' client-retention decisions. We find that, with the exception of RAM through overproduction, clients' opportunistic operating decisions are positively associated with the likelihood of auditor resignations. We also provide evidence that auditors are especially sensitive to clients' RAM to just meet or beat earnings benchmarks in their client-retention decisions. In addition, we find that clients whose auditors resign from engagements tend to hire smaller auditors and these clients engage in RAM more aggressively. Our additional analysis shows that, with the exception of RAM through overproduction, clients' abnormal operating decisions are significantly associated with litigation risk against auditors. Overall, our evidence suggests that auditors drop clients with aggressive RAM to avoid excessive risk. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, (2) to manipulate real operating activities, and (3) to be the subject of SEC investigations, as evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases against top executives. Our results are robust to (1) controlling for various incentives for CSR and earnings management, (2) considering various CSR dimensions and components, and (3) using alternative proxies for CSR and accruals quality. To the extent that we control for the potential effects of reputation and financial performance, our findings suggest that ethical concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

We examine positive and negative information transfers associated with management earnings and revenue forecasts. Positive information transfers are due to industry commonalities whereas negative information transfers are caused by competitive shifts. We argue that positive and negative intra‐industry information transfers offset each other and lead to an overall finding of no information transfers even though they exist. We also conjecture that the type of information transfers from the same management forecast can be positive or negative based on the characteristics of the information receiver. We hypothesize positive information transfers to nonrival firms and negative information transfers to rivals. Consistent with our prediction, we find negative (positive) information transfers between forecasting firms and nonforecasting rival (nonrival) firms in the same industry. Through analyses using competitors identified by Hoover's and 10‐K reports, we show more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms.