Time constraints, managerial power, and reputational concerns can impede board communication. This paper develops a model where board decisions depend on directors' effort in communicating their information to others. I show that directors communicate more effectively when pressure for conformity is stronger—that is, when directors are more reluctant to disagree with each other. Hence, open ballot voting can be optimal, even though it induces directors to disregard their information and conform their votes to others. I also show that communication can be more efficient when directors' preferences are more diverse. The analysis has implications for executive sessions, transparency, and committees.

Time constraints, managerial power, and reputational concerns can impede board communication. This paper develops a model where board decisions depend on directors' effort in communicating their information to others. I show that directors communicate more effectively when pressure for conformity is stronger—that is, when directors are more reluctant to disagree with each other. Hence, open ballot voting can be optimal, even though it induces directors to disregard their information and conform their votes to others. I also show that communication can be more efficient when directors' preferences are more diverse. The analysis has implications for executive sessions, transparency, and committees.

We develop a theory of leveraged buyout (LBO) activity based on two elements: the ability of private equity-owned firms to borrow against their sponsors׳ reputation with creditors and externalities in sponsors׳ reputations due to competition and club formation. In equilibrium, the two sources of value creation in LBOs, operational improvements and financing, are complements. Moreover, sponsors that never add operational value cannot add value through financing either. Club deals are beneficial ex post by allowing low-reputation bidders with high valuations to borrow reputation from high-reputation bidders with low valuations, but they can destroy value by reducing bidders׳ investment in reputation. Unlike leverage of independent firms, driven only by firm-specific factors, buyout leverage is driven by economy-wide and sponsor-specific factors.

Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift toward “pass-through voting,” with funds offering investors a choice: delegate votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a framework to study the implications of voting choice. While it helps reflect heterogeneous investor preferences, it also shapes the informational content of the vote, and these forces can conflict. When interests are aligned, voting choice improves information aggregation and investor welfare. With preference heterogeneity or costly information, however, it can make investors worse off by weakening informed.

Proxy advisory firms have become important players in corporate governance, but the extent of their influence over shareholder votes is debated. We estimate the effect of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations on voting outcomes by exploiting exogenous variation in ISS recommendations generated by a cutoff rule in ISS voting guidelines. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that from 2010 to 2011, a negative ISS recommendation on a say-on-pay proposal leads to a 25 percentage point reduction in say-on-pay voting support, suggesting a strong influence over shareholder votes. We also use our setting to examine the informational role of ISS recommendations.

We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision‐making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.

This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance in turn affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a shareholder‐friendly or management‐friendly reputation is determined in equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directors' desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across firms. Directors' reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. We derive implications for multiple directorships, board size, transparency, and board independence.

Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for shareholder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders. We analyze whether nonbinding voting is an effective mechanism for conveying shareholder expectations. We show that, unlike binding voting, nonbinding voting generally fails to convey shareholder views when manager and shareholder interests are not aligned. Surprisingly, the presence of an activist investor who can discipline the manager may enhance the advisory role of nonbinding voting only if conflicts of interest between shareholders and the activist are substantial.

We develop a dynamic model of board decision-making akin to dynamic voting models in the political economy literature. We show a board could retain a policy all directors agree is worse than an available alternative. Thus, directors may retain a CEO they agree is bad—deadlocked boards lead to entrenched CEOs. We explore how to compose boards and appoint directors to mitigate deadlock. We find board diversity and long director tenure can exacerbate deadlock. We rationalize why CEOs and incumbent directors have power to appoint new directors: to avoid deadlock. Our model speaks to short-termism, staggered boards, and proxy access.

We analyze how a profit‐maximizing proxy advisor designs vote recommendations and research reports. The advisor benefits from producing informative, unbiased reports, but only partially informative recommendations, biased against the a priori likely alternative. Such recommendations induce close votes, increasing controversy and thereby the relevance and value of proxy advice. Our results suggest shifting from an exclusive emphasis on recommendations, highlighting the importance of both reports and recommendations in proxy advisors' information provision. They rationalize the one‐size‐fits‐all approach and help reinterpret empirical patterns of voting behavior, suggesting that proxy advisors' recommendations may not be a suitable benchmark for evaluating shareholders' votes.