Negative abnormal stock returns of about 1% occur near record dates of stock splits. Further, the lower the returns, the more positive are ex-date returns and when-issued premiums. A possible explanation of these related phenomena is that trading hindrances associated with record dates create trading inconvenience that is reflected in lower prices near record dates. In turn, anomalous positive ex-date returns arise in part from the abnormally low prices of unsplit shares caused by the negative record date returns.

We present the first evidence that initial ratings of commercial paper influence common stock returns. Highly‐rated industrial issues of commercial paper, unaccompanied by bank letters of credit, are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns; lower‐rated issues are not. The stock price effects of changes in commercial paper ratings also demonstrate the relevance of ratings to the financing of firms. Rating downgrades, especially those that imply an exit from the commercial paper market, produce significantly negative abnormal returns; upgrades have no effects. Initial commercial paper ratings and subsequent reratings appear to help investors sort firms by their future prospects.

We present the first evidence that initial ratings of commercial paper influence common stock returns. Highly-rated industrial issues of commercial paper, unaccompanied by bank letters of credit, are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns; lower-rated issues are not. The stock price effects of changes in commercial paper ratings also demonstrate the relevance of ratings to the financing of firms. Rating downgrades, especially those that imply an exit from the commercial paper market, produce significantly negative abnormal returns; upgrades have no effects. Initial commercial paper ratings and subsequent reratings appear to help investors sort firms by their future prospects.

The authors present the first evidence that initial ratings of commercial paper influence common stock returns. Highly rated industrial issues of commercial paper, unaccompanied by bank letters of credit, are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns; lower-rated issues are not. The stock price effects of changes in commercial paper ratings also demonstrate the relevance of ratings to the financing of firms. Rating downgrades, especially those that imply an exit from the commercial paper market, produce significantly negative abnormal returns; upgrades have no effects. Initial commercial paper ratings and subsequent reratings appear to help investors sort firms by their future prospects.

The topic of make-whole call provisions on bond issues remains a relatively unexplored area in modern finance literature, with the exception of Mann and Powers [Mann, S.V. and Powers, E.A., 2003, Indexing a Bond's Call Price: An Analysis of Make-whole Call Provisions, Journal of Corporate Finance 9(5), 535–554.]. This paper examines the corporate finance implications of including such a call feature in bond issuances, and how such issuances are different from bond issuances which are not callable, or which employ regular call features. We find that bond issuances employing make-whole call provisions (1) are accompanied by a significantly positive stock price reaction, (2) exhibit superior post-issuance stock returns, and (3) are associated with positive analyst revisions in the long-term growth rate of earnings. These results suggest that bond issuances which include make-whole call provisions are indeed very different from the other issuances, and are clearly not a case of “much ado about nothing”.

We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence from exogenous variation suggests that the relationship is causal. Lender-affiliated analysts are also more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts below their peers’ consensus. These forecasts are likely to be followed by below-consensus earnings. The results suggest that lender-affiliated analysts enjoy an informational advantage that spills over from lending activities of banks.

Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report negative, statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns over five years following convertible bond calls. We show that these results are obtained only if returns preceding the call dates are used for market model parameter estimation. Returns preceding calls tend to be positive and unusually large. This means that predicted post-call returns, based on pre-call parameter estimates, are biased upward. Consequently, the corresponding abnormal returns are biased downward. We also discuss a corrected test statistic. We conclude that the evidence does not indicate market inefficiency in the stock price reaction to convertible calls.

Average common stock price responses to convertible preferred stock calls are significantly negative only when firms employ underwriters to assure conversion. Previous work reports similar results for convertible bond calls; we find that the stock price reaction does not depend upon the type of convertible security being called. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to have calls underwritten the more unfavorable their private information about firm value.

Common-stock prices fall a statistically significant 2 percent in response to underwritten convertible debt call announcements. We find that the significant negative price reaction is confined to underwritten calls — stock-price responses to non-underwritten calls average an insignificant −0.84 percent. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to use underwriters the more unfavorable the information they possess about future firm cash flows. An agency cost interpretation of underwritten calls is also consistent with the results, but is not supported by management ownership and corporate liquidity evidence.