This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.
This paper analyzes the incentive effects of alternative legal systems on the auditor's decision making process. The first system, termed strict liability, holds the auditor liable whenever there is a loss, and the second system, termed negligence, holds the auditor liable for losses arising from the auditor's deviation from a prescribed due care standard. The auditor is assumed to have ex ante limited knowledge of the financial state of the client and the standard setting process. He revises his beliefs on the client's financial state based on a costless signal that may be interpreted as an internal audit report. The analysis shows that signal “quality” and auditor's perception of the client's financial state jointly determine the level of liability required to induce the auditor to adopt a socially optimal due care level. As in Simon's (1982) Model, negligence with supplementary insurance is preferred to strict liability. Further, negligence is shown to operate with less information than strict liability, in contrast to models such as Green (1978) and Shavell (1978). Résumé. Cet article analyse les effets incitatifs de systèmes juridiques alternatifs sur le processus décisionnel du vérificateur. Le premier système, dit de responsabilité stricte, considère le vérificateur responsable à chaque fois qu'il y a une perte, et le deuxième système, dit de négligence, considère le vérificateur responsable des pertes résultant de sa déviance d'une norme prescrite. Le vérificateur est supposé posséder ex ante une connaissance limitée de la situation financière du client ainsi que du processus de normalisation. Il révise ses opinions portant sur la situation financière du client à la lumière d'un signal sans frais qui peut être assimilé à un rapport de vérification interne. L'analyse montre qu'un signal «qualité» ainsi que la perception du vérificateur quant à la situation financière du client déterminent conjointement le niveau de responsabilité requis pour inciter le vérificateur à retenir un niveau de soin raisonnable socialement optimal. De même que le modèle de Simon (1982), le système de négligence avec assurances additionnelles est préféré à la responsabilité stricte. De plus, il est montré que le système de négligence fonctionne avec moins d'information que le système de responsabilité stricte, par opposition à d'autres modèles tels Green (1978) et Shavell (1978).
Journal of Accounting and Economics199621(2), 253-275
This paper shows through increasing disclosure requirements may induce firms to reduce their value-relevant disclosures. In the absence of segment reporting requirements, an incumbent firm may voluntarily disclose value-relevant information because it can use other, value-irrelevant, information to jam proprietary disclosures. However, when required to disclose segment data, the incumbent may aggregate proprietary information with other value-relevant information to deter entry by a rival. Hence, the firm does not disclose value-relevant information it would have revealed voluntarily in the absence of segment disclosure requirements. In such situations, requiring more disaggregate disclosures can actually decrease price efficiency.
Journal of Accounting and Economics19857(1-3), 151-174open access
Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's ‘talents’ and decision-making responsibility, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement.
This study examines the antecedents and consequences of analysts choosing to become supply chain analysts (i.e., analysts following both a supplier and its major customer). We find that information complementarities between firms in the same supply chain, between a supplier firm and its industry peer firms, and between the supplier's major customer and other firms in analysts' portfolio affect their supply chain specialization decision. The potential revenues supplier firms generate for analysts' brokerage houses also significantly affect this decision. While supply chain analysts achieve superior forecast performance compared to non-supply chain analysts for supplier firms, they provide lower-quality forecasts for other firms in their portfolios. These findings suggest that analysts allocate resources strategically. Our results are robust to techniques designed to address the potential endogeneity of analysts' supply chain portfolio choices.
This paper provides evidence that all‐equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all‐equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all‐equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.
This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.
For 2,695 US corporations from 1996 to 2009, we find that alignment in political orientation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and independent directors is associated with lower firm valuations, lower operating profitability, and increased internal agency conflicts such as a reduced likelihood of dismissing poorly performing CEOs, a lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. Importantly, we show that our results are driven neither by the effects associated with various measures of similarity and diversity within the board nor the effects of local director labor market and political conditions on board structure. We provide evidence that our measure of individual political orientation reflects the person׳s political beliefs rather than opportunistic attempts to seek political favor. Overall, our results suggest that diversity in political beliefs among corporate board members is valuable.
Journal of Accounting Research201048(5), 1015-1047open access
Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we call Retention Light. Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO's decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO. We find that when prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is more likely to be retained on the board (Retention Light) than to exit the firm. However, this relation is weaker when the CEO reaches normal retirement age at which time CEO power becomes more important. We also provide evidence on how the nature of the CEO's bargaining power varies with his personal attributes and board characteristics in its influence on the Retention Light decision. Retention Light firms are more likely than CEO‐exit firms to select a successor CEO with relatively weaker bargaining power. Finally, Retention Light involving a nonfounder CEO is negatively associated with the firm's postturnover financial performance. Overall, Retention Light is a distinct CEO turnover option that has important consequences for board decisions and firm performance.