We examine managerial compensation and wealth sensitivities around CEO changes. The average new CEO is incentivized to increase the risk of the firm primarily because he holds significantly less stock than his predecessor, and in fact riskier policy choices are subsequently implemented. Similar results are obtained in a subsample of CEO changes that are due to retirements and deaths, which alleviates concerns about endogeneity. Our findings indicate that firms seem to be limited in their ability to mitigate the risk-averse behavior caused by large CEO shareholdings.

We study whether asset-class risk dynamics can help explain the predominantly negative stock-bond return relation and movements in the term structure’s slope over 1997–2011. Using option-derived implied volatilities to measure risk, we find i) the negative stock-bond return relation largely disappears when controlling for risk movements, at both monthly and weekly horizons; ii) the partial relation between equity-risk changes and 10-year T-bond excess returns (term-slope movements) is reliably positive (negative); and iii) a stronger link between equity risk and stock returns implies a more negative stock-bond return correlation. Our results suggest a flight-to-quality influence between equity-risk dynamics and longer-term Treasury pricing.