We first develop a theory-based metric to judge the popularity of value weighting in a stock market. We then use our metric to document that although value weighting is less popular in emerging markets than in developed markets, its popularity is increasing almost everywhere. Finally, as we have better data for the United States, we explore why value weighting is becoming more popular in the United States.

We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns shares; and deviations fall more when the blockholder appoints a director to the firm. When a firm is above (below) target, blockholders are associated with less (more) inside debt and more (no change in) inside equity, implying there is no “one-size-fits-all” compensation change for blockholders. Outside debt and equity increase for both above and below target firms.

We examine the components of displayed (quoted) liquidity and the amount of non-displayed liquidity on the NYSE for a sample of non-US stocks. Consistently with prior work, non-US stocks have less displayed liquidity than similar US stocks. Extending prior research, we find that this is true both in the limit order book and on the floor. As Domowitz et al. [Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan, A., 1998. International cross-listing and order flow migration: Evidence from and emerging market. Journal of Finance 53, 2001–2027] posit, non-US stocks from transparent/linked home markets have more displayed NYSE liquidity when the home market is open but non-US stocks from opaque/non-linked home markets have more NYSE displayed liquidity when the home market is closed. Non-US and US stocks have similar supplies of non-displayed liquidity, consistent with the idea that the conditional nature of non-displayed liquidity allows NYSE traders to mitigate adverse selection problems inherent in trading non-US stocks. Our results imply that non-US stocks have less total (displayed plus non-displayed) liquidity than US stocks.

We examine listing applications by firms to the London Stock Exchange between 1891 and 1911. The exchange rejected 82 (13.1%) of the 628 applicants to its main board. Accepted applicants were twice as likely to pay dividends (and to pay twice as much) and had longer firm lives than rejected applicants. Rejected applicants were more likely to file for liquidation than successful applicants. These results remain even after we control for the primary benefits of the listing itself: liquidity and future capital inflows. In this era, the London Stock Exchange could screen applicants for listing.

We use firm and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics motivated by optimal contracting theory to estimate optimal CEO relative debt-equity incentive ratios. Equity values rise as firms adjust CEO incentive ratios toward their predicted optimums, whether that increases or decreases the relative incentive ratio. Debt values rise as firms adjust ratios upward and do not fall as they adjust them downward. Our predicted optimums explain changes in equity and debt values better than a model in which firms simply match CEO inside debt-equity ratios to firm debt-equity ratios. The results suggest important cross-sectional differences in firms’ optimal inside debt policies.

We read all news items that came out between 1996 and 2000 on 458 Internet initial public offerings (IPOs) and a matching sample of 458 non-Internet IPOs (a total of 171,488 news items) and classify each news item as good news, neutral news, or bad news. We first document that the media were more positive for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic rise in share prices and more negative for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic fall in share prices. We then document that media hype is unable to explain the Internet bubble: A 1,646% difference exists in returns between Internet stocks and non-Internet stocks from January 1, 1997, through March 24, 2000 (the market peak), and the media can explain only 2.9% of that.