We study the relationship among productivity, management practices, and employee ability using German data combining management practices surveys with employees’ longitudinal earnings records. Including human capital reduces the association between productivity and management practices by 30%–50%. Only a small fraction is accounted for by the higher human capital of the average employee at better-managed firms. A larger share is attributable to the human capital of the highest-paid workers, that is, the managers. A similar share is mediated through the pay premiums offered by better-managed firms. We find that better-managed firms recruit and retain workers with higher average human capital.

We investigate the role of uncertainty in business cycles. First, we demonstrate that microeconomic uncertainty rises sharply during recessions, including during the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Second, we show that uncertainty shocks can generate drops in gross domestic product of around 2.5% in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. However, we also find that uncertainty shocks need to be supplemented by first†moment shocks to fit consumption over the cycle. So our data and simulations suggest recessions are best modelled as being driven by shocks with a negative first moment and a positive second moment. Finally, we show that increased uncertainty can make first†moment policies, like wage subsidies, temporarily less effective because firms become more cautious in responding to price changes.

We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms. (JEL D21, D24, H25, L52, O31, O34)