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Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Review of Economic Studies 2004 71(1), 165-191
Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting.Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A "good" voting rule must give incentives to acquire information,as well as aggregate information efficiently. A voting rule that requires a large plurality (in the extreme, unanimity) to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each agent is sufficiently accurate. This result is independent of the preferences of voters and of the cost of information. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(5), 1019-1053
Taller workers receive a wage premium. Net of differences in family background, the disparity is similar in magnitude to the race and gender gaps. We exploit variation in an individual’s height over time to explore how height affects wages. Controlling for teen height essentially eliminates the effect of adult height on wages for white men. The teen height premium is not explained by differences in resources or endowments. The teen height premium is partially mediated through participation in high school sports and clubs. We estimate the monetary benefits of a medical treatment for children that increases height.