We investigate whether the volatility risk premium is negative by examining the statistical properties of delta-hedged option portfolios (buy the option and hedge with stock). Within a stochastic volatility framework, we demonstrate a correspondence between the sign and magnitude of the volatility risk premium and the mean delta-hedged portfolio returns. Using a sample of S&P 500 index options, we provide empirical tests that have the following general results. First, the delta-hedged strategy underperforms zero. Second, the documented underperformance is less for options away from the money. Third, the underperformance is greater at times of higher volatility. Fourth, the volatility risk premium significantly affects delta-hedged gains, even after accounting for jump fears. Our evidence is supportive of a negative market volatility risk premium.

This article provides several new insights into the economic sources of skewness. First, we document the differential pricing of individual equity options versus the market index and relate it to variations in return skewness. Second, we show how risk aversion introduces skewness in the risk-neutral density. Third, we derive laws that decompose individual return skewness into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Empirical analysis of OEX options and 30 stocks demonstrates that individual risk-neutral distributions differ from that of the market index by being far less negatively skewed. This article explains the presence and evolution of risk-neutral skewness over time and in the cross section of individual stocks.

We document that short-horizon pricing discrepancies across firms' equity and credit markets are common and that an economically significant proportion of these are anomalous, indicating a lack of integration between the two markets. Proposing a statistical measure of market integration, we investigate whether equity–credit market integration is related to impediments to arbitrage. We find that time variation in integration across a firm's equity and credit markets is related to firm-specific impediments to arbitrage such as liquidity in equity and credit markets and idiosyncratic risk. Our evidence provides a potential resolution to the puzzle of why Merton model hedge ratios match empirically observed stock-bond elasticities (Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008) and yet the model is limited in its ability to explain the integration between equity and credit markets (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001).

We investigate whether the volatility risk premium is negative by examining the statistical properties of delta-hedged option portfolios (buy the option and hedge with stock). Within a stochastic volatility framework, we demonstrate a correspondence between the sign and magnitude of the volatility risk premium and the mean delta-hedged portfolio returns. Using a sample of S&P 500 index options, we provide empirical tests that have the following general results. First, the delta-hedged strategy underperforms zero. Second, the documented underperformance is less for options away from the money. Third, the underperformance is greater at times of higher volatility.Fourth, the volatility risk premium significantly affects delta-hedged gains even after accounting for jump-fears. Our evidence is supportive of a negative market volatility risk premium.

This article provides several new insights into the economic sources of skewness. First, we document the differential pricing of individual equity options versus the market index and relate it to variations in return skewness. Second, we show how risk aversion introduces skewness in the risk-neutral density. Third, we derive laws that decompose individual return skewness into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Empirical analysis of OEX options and 30 stocks demonstrates that individual risk-neutral distributions differ from that of the market index by being far less negatively skewed. This article explains the presence and evolution of risk-neutral skewness over time and in the cross section of individual stocks.

We test the doubly stochastic assumption under which firms' default times are correlated only as implied by the correlation of factors determining their default intensities. Using data on U.S. corporations from 1979 to 2004, this assumption is violated in the presence of contagion or “frailty” (unobservable explanatory variables that are correlated across firms). Our tests do not depend on the time‐series properties of default intensities. The data do not support the joint hypothesis of well‐specified default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption. We find some evidence of default clustering exceeding that implied by the doubly stochastic model with the given intensities.