Beginning in the 1990s, firms often continue to trade on the major national exchanges after Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. For bankruptcies filed from 1993–2003, we find that the more negative the filing period price reaction, the more favorable the immediate post-filing returns, on average. This reversal is not attributable to bid-ask bounce, it holds after controlling for other factors associated with post-filing returns, and it appears more attributable to the activities of large traders than to small traders. Supplementary tests reveal that the pattern of post-filing returns differs significantly for bankruptcies filed in bull versus bear markets. Bankruptcies filed during the 1993 to 1999 bull market enjoy substantial but short-lived reversals averaging one-third of the filing period price plunge. These reversals are inconsistent with efficient assimilation of the bankruptcy information. In contrast, we find no evidence of post-filing reversals for bankruptcies filed from 2000 to 2003.

In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standard-setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.