The sources of revenue; how much from loans, how much from taxes, 216. — Comparison with the World War, 219. — Relation of unfunded loans to total borrowing, 220. — Remittances to foreign countries: the machinery of payment, 222. — Total of loans and subsidies, 225. — Import and export statistics unattainable, 229.

The circumstances attending the Bank Restriction, 398. — Deviations in exchange rates and specie, 398. — Sentiments of Paine, Fox, and Sheridan; their political objectives, 400. — Walter Boyd's statement of a depreciation theory; responsibility attributed solely to the Bank; indices of excessive issue, 404. — Henry Thornton and the purchasing-power-parity theory; confusion between convertible and inconvertible conditions; defense of the Bank, 407. — Horner's interpretation, 411. — Lord King's view of excess and depreciation; disregard of political factors; exoneration of the country banks, 413. — John Wheatley's program for war financing by systematic lowering of prices; refutation of the country-bank doctrine, 415. — Writings of Ricardo; agitation for immediate contraction of Bank issues and possibly resumption of cash payments; theoretical confusions and inconsistencies; hostility to the Bank; possibly explained by stock-exchange interests, 423. — The Bullion Committee Report a theoretical essay divorced from facts, abounding in misconceptions, and proposing impossible policy, 430. — Ricardo's striking change of attitude in 1819, 437.

T HE monetary and financial events which attended the military operations carried on by Great Britain and her continental allies against the armies of France, between I793 and i8I5, have acquired at this time a special interest. The wars of the Napoleonic era present, in their political and economic aspects, numerous points of similarity to, as well as interesting points of contrast with, the great war of the past five years. An examination of some of the financial experiences of England during and immediately following this earlier period may be useful, not only in setting forth historical parallels and contrasts, but in furnishing valuable lessons for our own time. It is proposed to consider in this paper, certain aspects of the financial history of England for a period beginning just before the war and extending to the year I830, thus including the interval of recovery and return to normal conditions. The object of this study is primarily to bring together statistical data concerning currency, prices, the rate of interest, etc., which are available without elaborate research and special calculation. It is not intended to enter at any length into a causal inquiry or reasoned interpretation of the events disclosed, but rather to present the materials in clear and usable form, enabling comparison to be made between the various sets of data and laying a basis for further investigation.