[In this paper we examine the effects of capital gains taxation on firms' investment and financing decisions. We develop a real-options model in which the timing of investment, the decision to default, and the firm's capital structure are endogenously and jointly determined. Our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting. It also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing, the higher the firm's stock price and the worse the firm's historical performance. Using a large sample of U.S. industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors between 1970 and 2008, we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing policies, which is supportive of the model's predictions.]

Dealers in the over‐the‐counter municipal bond market form trading networks with other dealers to mitigate search frictions. Regulatory data show that this network has a core‐periphery structure with 10 to 30 hubs and over 2,000 peripheral broker‐dealers in which bonds flow from periphery to core and partially back. Central dealers charge investors up to double the round‐trip markups compared to peripheral dealers. In turn, central dealers provide immediacy by matching buyers with sellers more directly and prearranging fewer trades, especially during stress times. Investors thus face a trade‐off between execution cost and speed, consistent with network models of decentralized trade.

Municipal bonds trade in decentralized broker-dealer markets, and are underpriced when issued, but unlike equities the average price rises slowly over several days. Newly issued municipal bonds have high levels of price dispersion and the average price rises because the mix of trade sizes changes over time. While large trades occur close to the reoffering price, small trades occur between the reoffering price to as much as 5% above the reoffering price. Using a mixed-distribution model we quantify the losses uninformed traders or issuers give up to broker-dealers.

[Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyze a database of trades between broker-dealers and customers in municipal bonds. These data were only released to the public with a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higher risk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargaining model and compute measures of dealer's bargaining power. Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in the complexity of the trade for the dealer.]

Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyze a database of trades between broker-dealers and customers in municipal bonds. These data were only released to the public with a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higher risk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargaining model and compute measures of dealer?s bargaining power. Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in the complexity of the trade for the dealer.

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.

In this paper we examine the effects of capital gains taxation on firms' investment and financing decisions. We develop a real-options model in which the timing of investment, the decision to default, and the firm's capital structure are endogenously and jointly determined. Our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting. It also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing, the higher the firm's stock price and the worse the firm's historical performance. Using a large sample of U.S. industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors between 1970 and 2008, we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing policies, which is supportive of the model's predictions.

This paper documents a new channel for rating-based bond market segmentation, which, in contrast to prior research, is based on nonregulatory investment management practices. A 2005 Lehman Brothers index redefinition provides a quasinatural experiment in which a number of previously high-yield split-rated bonds were mechanically relabeled as investment grade. Although their regulatory standing was unaffected, these bonds had abnormal yield declines of 21 basis points. These valuation changes can be traced to buying by asset-class-sensitive institutional investors for whom these bonds became investable. Reputation, regulation, indexation, and liquidity cannot explain the observed price and trading patterns.

We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.