The transition from London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) affects the reference rate of floating-rate debt worth trillions of dollars. We provide the first evidence highlighting a benefit of the benchmark transition for debt markets. Focusing on the market for dollar-denominated floating rate notes (FRNs), we compare the yield spreads of FRNs linked to LIBOR and SOFR, issued by the same entity during the same month. After adjusting for the maturity-matched spreads from derivatives markets, we find significantly lower spreads for SOFR-linked FRNs. We link this SOFR discount to the enhanced price stability of SOFR-linked FRNs.

We examine the alternative reference rates that are set to replace the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as benchmark rate by the end of 2021. After providing the relevant background, we show that: (i) depending on the marginal lenders, tighter regulatory constraints can either increase or decrease the alternative benchmarks; (ii) increases in the amount of government debt outstanding increase the alternative benchmarks, more so for collateralized rates; and (iii) more central bank reserves lower the alternative benchmarks. In addition, we show that term rates based on the alternative reference rates can be detached from banks’ marginal funding costs.

Using transaction level data from the inter-dealer market, we find that the price impact of one standard deviation change in FX swap order flow has increased from less than one basis point prior to 2008 to about five basis points after 2008. However, the increase in price impact is confined to periods of elevated dispersion in funding costs and over quarterends. Central bank swap lines reduce the order flow into USD, subsequently affecting the FX forward rate. In contrast, over quarter-ends and after monetary policy announcements we observe that dealers immediately adjust prices to curb order flow.

To understand deviations from covered interest parity (CIP), it is crucial to account for heterogeneity in funding costs across both banks and currency areas. For most market participants, the no-arbitrage relation holds fairly well when implemented using marginal funding costs and risk-free investment instruments. However, a few high-rated banks do enjoy CIP-arbitrage opportunities. Dealers avert inventory imbalances stemming from lower-rated banks’ usage of FX swaps to obtain dollar funding by inducing opposite (arbitrage) flows from high-rated banks. Arbitrage trades are difficult to scale, however, because funding costs increase as soon as arbitrageurs increase positions.