Using an international sample, I investigate whether the extent of firms' disclosure of their accounting policies in the annual report is associated with properties of analysts' earnings forecasts. Controlling for firm‐ and country‐level variables, I find that the level of accounting policy disclosure is significantly negatively related to forecast dispersion and forecast error. In particular, I find that accounting policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other annual report disclosures. These findings suggest that accounting policy disclosures reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. I find univariate but not multivariate support for the hypothesis that accounting policy disclosures are especially helpful to analysts in environments where firms can choose among a larger set of accounting methods.

Using a sample from 22 countries, I investigate the relations between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. I document that firm‐level disclosures are positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to analysts. I construct a comprehensive measure of enforcement and find that strong enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. I also find evidence consistent with disclosures being more important when analyst following is low and with enforcement being more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed.

This study examines the effect of peer-level analyst transitions (i.e., switching between brokerage houses) on associated regular incumbent analysts' forecasting performance. We employ a difference-in-differences research design with analyst fixed effects and compare incumbent analysts of different groups within the same broker and same time periods. We find that incumbents who cover at least one common industry as the transiting analyst (i.e., affected incumbents) issue more accurate and timely forecasts after a transiting analyst arrives than incumbents who cover different industries (i.e., unaffected incumbents). Further, affected incumbents issue less accurate forecasts after a transiting analyst leaves than do unaffected incumbents. We also examine potential mechanisms of knowledge spillover and find some evidence that the effect is more salient when the transiting analyst switches from a larger brokerage house, has greater industry scope, or covers geographically linked firms.

This paper examines economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission regulation that mandated public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, we find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, and that the reduction in RPTs is negatively associated with the implied cost of capital (ICC) and positively related to Tobin's Q. These effects are more pronounced for low-monitored firms and for firms with RPTs that are more likely to be opportunistic. We further find that firms with a formal written policy, a designated committee to review and approve RPTs, or more extensive disclosure on RPT governance benefit in terms of lower ICC.

We examine the issue of auditor independence in a unique setting. Specifically, we test for auditor independence impairment among (1) private client firms, for which the risk of auditor reputation loss is lower than for publicly traded firms, and (2) in a low litigation environment (i.e., Norway) that further reduces the expected costs to the auditor associated with independence impairment. We have thus chosen a setting that gives independence impairment its best chance of being detected if it exists. Using a large sample of private Norwegian firms, we analyze whether auditors who receive higher fees are less likely to issue modified opinions. Despite the low litigation risk and the reduced reputation risk, our empirical results provide no evidence that auditors compromise their independence through fee dependence. These results are robust to controlling for the expected portion of fees, to different sample specifications, to the use of both levels and changes specifications, and to a number of sensitivity analyses.

Employing the SEC Tick Size Pilot Program, which increases the minimum trading unit of a set of randomly selected small-capitalization stocks, we examine whether and how an exogenous change in stock liquidity affects corporate voluntary disclosure. Using difference-in-differences analyses with firm fixed effects, we find that treatment firms respond to the liquidity decline by issuing fewer management earnings forecasts, while, in contrast, control firms do not exhibit a significant change. Next we show that the effect is more pronounced when firms experience more severe liquidity decreases during the TSPP and rule out a set of alternative explanations. Further strengthening the identification, we find a consistent reversal effect after the end of the pilot program. To generalize our findings, we use voluntary 8-K filings and conference calls as alternative voluntary disclosure proxies and find similar effects. Overall, these findings show how an exogenous change in stock liquidity shapes the corporate information environment.

Accounting big baths are pervasive in practice. While big baths can improve the information environment and reduce information asymmetry, they can also degrade the information environment and obscure operating performance. In this study, we examine the role of management ethics. Specifically, we investigate whether managers’ truthfulness (or conversely, deceptiveness) affects how investors perceive big baths. Using linguistic analysis on earnings-conference calls to measure managerial deception and employing a difference-in-differences research design with propensity-score matching, we find that information asymmetry is significantly higher following big baths taken by deceptive CEOs, compared with big baths taken by less deceptive CEOs.