The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy debate in the United States. To explore the trade-offs, I construct a structural model with information asymmetries, which may generate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that eliminating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of inefficient divorces.

This paper proposes a new approach to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility premium. In contrast to the popular two-pass regression method, this approach relies on a novel GMM-type estimation procedure that uses only a single cross-section of return observations to obtain consistent estimates. Also, it enables a comparison of idiosyncratic volatility premia estimated using stock returns with different holding periods. The approach is empirically illustrated by applying it to daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual US stock return data over the course of 2000–2011. The results suggest that the idiosyncratic volatility premium tends to be positive on daily return data, but negative on monthly, quarterly, and annual data. They also indicate the presence of a January effect.

We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance.