This paper presents the first theoretical model of the profit maximizing price-setting policy for the issuers of exchange-traded retail certificates. Unlike previous theoretical microstructure models, the market considered is unique in that the market makers do not face significant inventory costs or risk from informed traders. The model derives the time structure of the optimal markups over a certificate’s fair theoretical value and its relationship with optimal spreads, unhedgeable risk faced by the issuer and investors’ buying and selling decisions. It shows that (i) the optimal markups decrease inter-temporally, (ii) issuers adjust the markups according to investors’ demand, (iii) unhedgeable risk results in higher markups and influences their time structure, (iv) the markups and the spread are negatively related. Using data from the German market for leverage certificates, we find strong empirical support for the model-derived hypotheses, except for (iv). We find spreads exhibit little variation and this suggests that markups and spreads are not substitute profit sources for issuers in this market.

This paper examines the choices of retail investors in the market for structured financial products with a focus on implicit and explicit pricing components. We evaluate more than 72,000 single stock discount certificates on a daily basis from 2004 through 2008. The certificates are quoted an average of 0.58% above their fair value before the financial crisis, increasing to 1.24% during 2008. Although credit risk explains a major part (39%) of the certificates’ overpricing, we find that issuer default risk does not have any influence on investors’ product choices. Instead, retail investors are strongly influenced by irrational factors such as issuer and product familiarity. Finally, investors are found to make poor product choices (in terms of bid/ask spreads and markups over fair value), resulting in significant losses.