This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.

Introduction, 85. — I. The allegations, 87. — II. The model, 90. — III. Wage barrier parameters in the bituminous coal industry, 101. — IV. Industry structure, 108. — V. Conclusions, 113.

Introduction, 579. — I. A gross description, 580. — II. A dynamic model, 582; the interfirm relationships, 582; a differential equations model, 585; proposed measurements, 594. — III. Extensions, 595; a self-recovery mechanism, 596; the influence of structure, 599; the effects of regulatory restraint, 603.— IV. Conclusions, 606.

I. Introduction, 112. — II. The selling expense barrier to entry, 113. — III. Probabilistic considerations, 124. — IV. Relevance to the theory of imperfect competition, 127.

Oliver E. Williamson delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.

В этой статье Уильямсон использует концепцию трансакционных издержек для анализа природы вертикальной интеграции. Автор классифицирует и последовательно рассматривает виды провалов рынка (market failures), которые делают выгодной интернализацию производства.

James Buchanan avers that “mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is…the most fundamental of all understandings in economics ” (2001, p. 29). He further contends that this fundamental understanding is better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens of choice (1975). Because the latter has been the reigning paradigm in economics during the 20th century (Robbins, 1932; Reder, 1999), the lens of contract is (understandably) less fully developed. Interest in contractual approaches has nevertheless been building up, whence the gap between these two has been closing. This paper sketches some of these developments, with emphasis on private ordering. I begin with a brief discussion of the lenses of choice and contract. I then argue that the contractual approach is responsive to a growing sense of unease with orthodoxy. The rudiments of the private ordering approach to comparative economic organization, with emphasis on ex post governance, are then set out. Fully formal theories of contract are briefly discussed. Concluding remarks follow.