A core responsibility of a central bank is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its Discount Window. The Discount Window, however, has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we study experimentally how such stigma can be cured. We find that, once a Discount Window facility is stigmatized, removing stigma is difficult. This result is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s experiences which have been unsuccessful at removing the stigma associated with its Discount Window.

A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular random DW borrowing can overcome DW stigma. Implications for other forms of stigma in finance are discussed.

We study insurance and portfolio decisions, two opposite risk retention tradeoffs. Using household level data, we identify the first joint determinants (e.g. subjective expectations, risk attitude) and frictions (e.g. liquidity constraints , financial literacy) in the literature. We also find key differences between the two decisions. Notably, contrary to economic intuition, risky asset holding and insurance coverage both increase with wealth . We show that this apparent puzzle is driven in part by a specific behavioral pattern (the poor invest too conservatively, while the rich over-insure), and can be explained by two factors: regret avoidance and nonperformance risk.

We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window (DW) during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that banks were willing to pay a premium of around 44 basis points (bps) across funding sources (126bps after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to avoid borrowing from the DW. DW stigma is economically relevant as it increased some banks' borrowing cost by 32bps of their pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the crisis. The implications of our results for the provision of liquidity by central banks are discussed.

Using a unique, randomized information experiment embedded in a survey, this paper investigates how consumers’ inflation expectations respond to new information. We find that respondents, on average, update their expectations in response to (certain types of) information, and do so sensibly, in a manner consistent with Bayesian updating. As a result of information provision, the distribution of inflation expectations converges toward its center and cross-sectional disagreement declines. We document heterogeneous information processing by gender and present suggestive evidence of respondents forecasting under asymmetric loss. Our results provide support for expectation-formation models in which agents form expectations rationally but face information constraints.